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ABSTRACT 
This Article—the first half of a diptych that continues with Divorce as a Formal Gender-Equality Right, 
22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming April 2020)—draws on the insight that the position of women in society 
is nowhere better reflected and constituted than in a nation’s personal status laws.  Contemporary feminist and 
constitutional scholars have devoted much attention to how the laws of marriage affect women’s status in society, 
but they have largely ignored the potential for divorce to vindicate gender equality norms—and many have 
overlooked recent political and legal developments that threaten to substantially restrict dissolution rights.  
This diptych seeks to fill in the academic void in feminist and constitutional scholarship by developing the 
constitutional argument for divorce as a gender equality right.  Recognizing that there are competing conceptions 
of what constitutional gender equality means, the thesis is that every interpretation of equal protection must 
guarantee a right of unilateral, no-fault exit from matrimonial chains.  This Article establishes the status of 
marital freedom as a gender-equality right under various substantive visions of constitutional equality.  The 
subsequent Article, Divorce as a Formal Gender-Equality Right, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 
April 2020), establishes the status of marital freedom as a gender-equality right under a formal understanding 
of constitutional equality. 
To expose the gender-equality implications of divorce law, this diptych unearths the lineage and function of divorce 
restrictions as gender-status regulation and outlines the gender-specific burdens they impose on women.  It further 
unveils contemporary attempts to restrict divorce as reflecting impermissible status-based judgments about women’s 
capacities, roles, and destinies.  All in all, this diptych concludes that divorce restrictions coerce women to perform 
the work of wifehood without altering the conditions that continue to make such work a principal cause of their 
subordination.  This makes unilateral no-fault divorce a fundamental right for women attempting to navigate  the 
world as equals and an imperative for a constitutional system committed to disestablishing gender hierarchy.    
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INTRODUCTION 
The position of women in a society is nowhere better reflected than in a 
nation’s personal status laws.1  Regrettably, the laws of marriage have long 
served as among the chief vehicles for cultivating women’s social and 
economic dependency on men, inculcating unequal gender roles, and 
inflicting status-harm on women as a class.  The laws of divorce—especially 
the fault regime that has dominated marital dissolution laws for much of 
American history—have likewise functioned to maintain gender hierarchy 
and reify sex-role stereotypes.  Even today, the egalitarian marriage is still 
more a myth than reality.2  American women in the twenty-first century 
routinely struggle against structural inequities in their marriages.  This 
inequity extends beyond the formal bounds of marriage.  It permeates all 
gender relations and, in doing so, impedes women’s progress towards full 
citizenship stature.  
Because of the role marriage has played in fostering both private 
patriarchy—the control a husband exerts over his wife within a family 
system3—and public patriarchy by impairing women’s position in society at 
large,4 feminists have insisted that equality in education, politics, and the 
workplace cannot be fully realized without corresponding changes in the 
gender hierarchy of the marital family.5  Accordingly, many liberal feminists 
 
1 See, e.g., Essam Fawzy, Muslim Personal Status Law in Egypt: The Current Situation and Possibilities of Reform 
Through Internal Initiatives, in WOMEN’S RIGHTS & ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW: PERSPECTIVES ON 
REFORM 27 (Lynn Welchman ed., 2004) (arguing that the unattainability of divorce for women in 
Egypt “place[s] women in the position of accepting their inferior status”); Karin Carmit Yefet, The 
Constitution and Female-Initiated Divorce in Pakistan: Western Liberalism in Islamic Garb, 34 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 553 (2011). 
 2 See, e.g., Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: Is There a Future for Egalitarian Marriage?, 
84 VA. L. REV. 509 (1998) (concluding based on bargaining theory that the prospects for egalitarian 
marriage, however narrowly defined, are dim); LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES 146 
(2006) (noting that marriage has not yet transformed to reflect altered gender roles).   
 3 Carol Brown, Mothers, Fathers and Children: From Private to Public Patriarchy, in WOMEN AND 
REVOLUTION 239 (Lydia Sargent ed., 1981).   
 4 See, e.g., SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 134, 149 (1989) (noting that 
the gendered marriage “radically limits” equality of opportunity for women, and that inequality 
within marriage has deep ramifications for the material, psychological, physical, and intellectual 
well-being of women).   
 5 Martha Albertson Fineman, Why Marriage?, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 239, 248–49 (2001) (arguing 
that feminists acknowledge that in order for women to act as full citizens in the public sphere, it is 
necessary to transform the marital family); OKIN, supra note 4, at 4 (noting that justice within 
marriage is a prerequisite to gaining equality in politics, at work, and in every other sphere).   
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have advocated egalitarian marriage, which would “encourage and facilitate 
the equal sharing by men and women of paid and unpaid work, of productive 
and reproductive labor,”6 as a crucial step towards rectifying women’s 
continued subordination and economic vulnerability.7  More radical feminist 
theorists, led by Martha Fineman, have gone so far as to call for the abolition 
of marriage altogether.8 
Neither solution, however, is adequate.  The first, egalitarian marriage, 
is a practical impossibility for the foreseeable future; it would require 
abolition of gender hierarchy where it is most entrenched.9  The second—
abolition of marriage—is misguided: it would deprive individuals and society 
of the recognized benefits of marriage without guaranteeing women legal 
protection against subordination in intimate relationships.10  
Instead, this diptych develops a modest, yet essential, innovative legal 
construct to counter marital inequality—a constitutional right to unilateral, 
no-fault divorce.  The substance of this right is not purely negative.  Its 
affirmative dimension is captured by the appellation “marital freedom.”  The 
right to marital freedom is imperative to combat marital subordination, one 
that is derived from multiple interpretations of America’s constitutional 
 
 6 OKIN, supra note 4, at 171. 
 7 Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric 
Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1987 (2003) (noting that NOW’s 
founding documents acknowledged that genuine social equality for women necessitates social 
reorganization of the family so that “women’s participation in family relations would no longer 
constitute an impediment to their participation in public life.”). 
 8 As Fineman maintains, insofar as society continues to assign responsibility for caretaking solely to 
the nuclear family, women will continue to carry the lion’s share of domestic work and child care 
responsibilities and women’s inequality therefore will persist both at home, within individual 
marriages, and in the workforce and society at large.  MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE 
NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 
230–36 (1995). 
 9 See OKIN, supra note 4, at 116 (conceding that this solution is “a radical break not only from 
prevailing patterns of behavior but also from widely, though not completely, shared understandings 
in our society about the social meanings, institutions, and implications of sexual difference.”); Wax, 
supra note 2, at 513 (concluding that while “egalitarian marriage is possible in some cases, it will be 
the exception rather than the rule.”). 
 10 Wax, supra note 2, at 637 (“[E]ven if legal marriage were abolished, people would continue to 
couple up . . . and to lose [relationship-specific] investments through sex-skewed opportunistic 
defections under conditions that favor the strong at the expense of the weak . . . .”); Carolyn J. 
Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 93 (2004) (“[P]eople will 
continue to partner despite the lack of legal marriage, but will do so without the protections against 
subordination that the law can provide.”). 
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commitment to gender equality.  Just as women are allowed to enter into 
marriage and choose to conform to gendered marital arrangements that may 
disadvantage them,11 this Article argues that women must enjoy a 
concomitant constitutional right to extricate themselves from rigid, even 
mandatory, societal and spousal expectations.  To paraphrase Jack Balkin, 
liberal divorce rights guarantee “choice under conditions of sex inequality”12 
and therefore are integral to women’s equality. 
For all their focus on the laws of marriage, contemporary feminist and 
constitutional scholars have largely ignored the potential of divorce as a 
gender equality right—and many have overlooked recent political and legal 
developments that threaten to turn back the clock on dissolution rights.  For 
most of American history, divorce law, shaped by rigid Christian doctrine, 
was expressly designed to make divorce difficult to achieve.  It was fault-
based, requiring one spouse to establish gross marital misconduct of the other  
utilizing a list of narrowly defined transgressions; most commonly adultery, 
desertion, and cruelty.  Only in the 1970s did states overwhelmingly move to 
eliminate fault regimes or supplement them with liberal no-fault grounds, like 
“incompatibility,” “breakdown of marriage,” or “irreconcilable 
differences.”13  This so-called divorce revolution has been widely considered 
“the twentieth century’s most significant contribution to family law.”14  
Ever since the start of the new millennium, however, legislation aimed at 
eliminating or at least weakening unilateral no-fault divorce laws has 
proliferated, with proposals for divorce-restrictive measures in over thirty 
states.15  Now, American divorce law is on the brink of a troubling paradigm 
 
 11 An increasing number of women are giving up the altar out of concern about gender equality, 
power within marriage, and domestic violence.  See, e.g., Kathryn Edin, What Do Low-Income Single 
Mothers Say About Marriage?, 47 SOC. PROBS. 112, 117–19, 130 (2000); Marcia Carlson, Sara 
McLanahan & Paula England, Union Formation in Fragile Families, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 237, 255–57 
(2004); MCCLAIN, supra note 2, at 133, 141. 
 12 This is the term Jack Balkin employs to describe the abortion right, which this Article endeavors to 
show applies with equal force to the right to divorce.  See Jack Balkin, How New Genetic Technologies 
Will Transform Roe v. Wade, 56 EMORY L.J. 843, 851 (2007). 
 13 JOHN DEWITT GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW § 8.01, at 238 (3d ed. 2005); 
Kenneth Rigby, Report and Recommendation of the Louisiana State Law Institute to the House Civil Law and 
Procedure Committee of the Louisiana Legislature Relative to the Reinstatement of Fault as a Prerequisite to a Divorce, 
62 LA. L. REV. 561, 576–77 (2002).  
 14 Herma Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview of Women’s Rights and Family Law 
in the United States During the Twentieth Century, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2017, 2039 (2000). 
 15 THEODORA OOMS ET AL., BEYOND MARRIAGE LICENSES: EFFORTS IN STATES TO 
STRENGTHEN MARRIAGE AND TWO-PARENT FAMILIES: A STATE-BY-STATE SNAPSHOT 10 
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shift.16  Various statutory reform efforts have embraced a range of procedural 
techniques to substantially stall or eliminate divorce: by mandating 
counseling, lengthy waiting periods, and spousal consent requirements; by 
exchanging no-fault for fault grounds; and even by restricting, or even 
abolishing,17 the right of parents of minor children to marital exit.18  In a 
prominent testament to the success of what is aptly called the “counter-
revolution,”19 three states to date have adopted “covenant marriage” 
legislation allowing couples to choose a form of marriage in which exit is 
severely restricted.20   
 These divorce restrictions are unconstitutional violations of gender 
equality because they  have both the purpose and effect of turning back the 
clock, not only on divorce rights but also on women’s roles and status in 
 
(2004) (“Since the mid-1990s, every state has made at least one policy change or undertaken at least 
one activity designed to promote marriage, strengthen two-parent families, or reduce divorce.”); see 
also Nicholas H. Wolfinger, The Mixed Blessings of No-Fault Divorce, 4 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. 
ADVOC. 407, 412 (2005) (describing states’ efforts to curb divorce in the late 1990s and early 2000s). 
 16 See ASHTON APPLEWHITE, CUTTING LOOSE: WHY WOMEN WHO END THEIR MARRIAGES DO 
SO WELL 65 (1997) (“a backlash against no-fault divorce is now in full swing”); J. Herbie DiFonzo 
& Ruth C. Stern, Addicted to Fault: Why Divorce Reform Has Lagged in New York, 27 PACE L. REV. 559, 
593 (2007) (describing somewhat recent criticism of no-fault divorce schemes).  
 17 Judith T. Younger, Marital Regimes: A Story of Compromise and Demoralization, Together with Criticism and 
Suggestions for Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 45, 90–94 (1981) (introducing a proposal to restrict 
divorce for those with children); Scott Maier, Breaking Up Is Harder to Do: Divorce Hits 21-Year Low, 
PALM BEACH POST, Jan. 6, 1996, at 1D (citing sociologist Debra Friedman’s proposal to “ban[] 
divorce when children are involved, except in extremely harmful situations . . . .”). 
 18 As Steven Nock predicted, “[s]ome type of divorce reform will probably exist in almost every state 
in the next 10 to 15 years.”  Mary Otto, ‘Save Marriage’ Push: Classes, Tougher Laws, SEATTLE TIMES, 
Mar. 3, 1999, at A9 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Katherine Shaw Spaht, A Proposal: Legal 
Re-Regulation of the Content of Marriage, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 243, 259 (2004) 
(“At the end of the twentieth century after suffering through the sexual revolution, the therapeutic 
revolution, the feminist revolution, and the divorce revolution, a nascent counter-revolution aimed 
at restoring traditional marriage has begun, both at the elite opinion level and at the grassroots 
level.”).  
 19 Lynn D. Wardle, Divorce Reform at the Turn of the Millennium: Certainties and Possibilities, 33 FAM. L.Q. 
783, 794 (1999) (quoting  Joel A. Nichols, Comment, Louisiana’s Covenant Marriage Law: A First Step 
Toward a More Robust Pluralism in Marriage and Divorce Law, 47 EMORY L.J. 929, 930 (1998) (internal 
citation omitted)); APPLEWHITE, supra note 16, at 65. 
 20 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:272–75 (West 2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-901 to -906 (West 
1998) (laying out a portion of a statutory scheme for covenant marriages); ARK. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 9-11-803 (West 2001); see also Joel A. Nichols, Louisiana's Covenant Marriage Law: A First Step Toward 
a More Robust Pluralism in Marriage and Divorce Law?, 47 EMORY L.J. 929, 974 (1998) (describing 
several legislatures that considered covenant marriage laws).  By the beginning of the twenty-first 
century, a total of twenty state legislatures had considered covenant marriage proposals, see Amy L. 
Stewart, Covenant Marriage: Legislating Family Values, 32 IND. L. REV. 509, 515 (1999).  
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society.  This diptych seeks to fill in the scholarly void by developing the 
constitutional argument for marital freedom as both a substantive and formal 
gender-equality right.  This Article, the first of two, develops the substantive 
gender-equality argument for the right to marital freedom, while its 
companion21 develops the formal gender-equality argument.   
This Article is structured as follows.  Part I presents the constitutional 
edifice of gender equality.  It begins with the Court’s conceptualization of the 
Equal Protection Clause in formal terms, using the “antidiscrimination” 
principle, which prohibits state action that overtly classifies citizens on the 
basis of group membership or that is ostensibly neutral but in fact motivated 
by a discriminatory purpose.  It then considers several competing, 
substantive visions of constitutional equality, all of which concern group 
status inequality, even when no facial classifications are drawn.  Most 
prominent among these theories is the “anti-subordination” principle, which 
has been explicitly endorsed by the Supreme Court’s dissenters and 
academic critics.  But anti-subordination has recently been implicitly 
adopted by the Supreme Court in a variety of different guises.  In particular, 
there is an emerging jurisprudence of gender equality/human dignity that 
straddles the divide between equal protection and substantive due process.   
Part II applies the substantive theories of gender equality to the divorce 
context.  It analyzes how laws that effectively compel wifehood by limiting 
exit injure women, showing that state action is implicated even when a 
husband’s subordination of his wife appears to be “private.”  First, it opens 
with a historical account, examining how the common law of marital status 
fostered the unequal position of women in marriage, how divorce restrictions 
served to lock women in patriarchal relationships, and how leading feminists 
of the era recognized the right to divorce as a substantive gender equality 
imperative.  Second, it documents the inequalities that plague modern 
marriages and continue to compromise women’s full citizenship, considering 
sociological evidence on the division of household labor, women’s lesser 
economic power and decision-making authority, and their heightened 
physical vulnerability.  Third, it analyzes women’s divorce accounts to 
establish that most women who seek marital freedom do so to escape 
inegalitarian relationships they find demeaning and to expose divorce as an 
 
 21 Karin Carmit Yefet, Divorce as a Formal Gender-Equality Right, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 
April 2020).   
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experience that enhances women’s independence and capacities for self-
governance.   
The law not only exacerbates gender inequality by locking women into 
relationships of social and economic dependency; Part III will show that it 
also plays an active role in maintaining gender inequality between husbands 
and wives once women have been “locked into” such relationships.  It 
concludes that the right to marital freedom is an important anti-
subordination remedy that substantially enhances women’s control over their 
own lives, and over their status more generally as equal citizens.   
This Article’s companion, Divorce as a Formal Gender-Equality Right,22 will 
construct a constitutional argument for marital freedom under the Supreme 
Court’s formal antidiscrimination-oriented Equal Protection Clause 
jurisprudence.  First, it will show that divorce-restrictive regulations were 
historically animated by discriminatory purposes and that fault grounds to 
this day are judicially applied in ways that raise equal-protection concerns.  
Second, it will show that the contemporary movement to restrict divorce 
repeats history: its impetus is to shore up the traditional family structure 
based on constitutionally proscribed views that subordinate women to the 
roles of wives and mothers.   
The cultural, structural, and legal forces that contribute to women’s 
inequality—and produce the need for a right to marital freedom—are broad 
and deep.  Divorce rights, of course, are not sufficient in and of themselves 
to stem these forces and secure gender equality in marriage and society.  Yet 
marital freedom is an indispensable step towards achieving gender equality 
and human dignity for women and families in  twenty-first century America.   
I.  CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS OF GENDER EQUALITY: FORMAL VERSUS 
SUBSTANTIVE UNDERSTANDINGS  
As befits “the most complex of constitutional guarantees,”23 gender 
equality has spurred a medley of analytical frameworks, both formal and 
substantive in nature.  This Part sketches the gender-equality theories that 
will buttress discussion of the divorce right.   
 
 22 Karin Carmit Yefet, Divorce as a Formal Gender-Equality Right, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 
April 2020).   
 23 Robert A. Sedler, The Settled Nature of American Constitutional Law, 48 WAYNE L. REV. 173, 247 (2002). 
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A.  Formal Gender Equality: The Antidiscrimination Principle  
Grounded in the experiences with slavery and racial segregation, the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been 
traditionally understood to guard against the false theory of racial difference 
and black inferiority.24  Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has 
long stressed the principle of color-blindness or “antidiscrimination” as the 
mediating principle at the core of equal protection.25  By virtue of this 
principle, also called the “anti-classification” or “anti-differentiation” 
principle, state classifications on “suspect” bases are invalid unless they satisfy 
the constitutional touchstones of strict scrutiny.26  Where a law creates no 
express classifications but still has a disparate impact on a suspect group, the 
 
 24 See, e.g., Robin West, Toward an Abolitionist Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 
111, 111–12 (1991) (“[T]he central meaning of the equal protection clause, and indeed of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in its entirety, is that the law must be colorblind.”).  
 25 See Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1976) (“The 
antidiscrimination principle fills a special need because . . . race-dependent decisions that are 
rational and purport to be based solely on legitimate considerations are likely in fact to rest on 
assumptions of the differential worth of racial groups or on the related phenomenon of racially 
selective sympathy and indifference.”); Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, And Equal 
Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1004–06 (1986) (explaining that the “anti-differentiation” 
principle underlies heightened scrutiny models and demands “equal treatment”); Owen M. Fiss, 
Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 108 (1976) (emphasizing that the 
“antidiscrimination principle” is a “mediating principle” that bridges the facial ambiguity of the 
text of the Equal Protection Clause and the judicially-crafted meaning contained therein). 
 26 Classifications based on race, national origin, and alienage have all been considered “suspect” 
classes deserving of strict scrutiny, the strictest level of judicial review.  See Foley v. Connelie, 435 
U.S. 291, 295–96 (1978) (noting that prior cases that involved state discrimination against “aliens 
as a class” prompted “close scrutiny” but declining to adopt a bright-line rule); San Antonio Indep. 
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (noting “traditional indicia of suspectness” that might 
warrant heightened scrutiny as a class “saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history 
of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a history of political powerlessness as to 
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process”); Graham v. 
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (“Aliens as a class are a prime example of a ‘discrete and 
insular’ minority . . . for whom . . . heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.”) (quoting United 
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 
(1967) (“At the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications . . . be 
subjected to the ‘most rigid scrutiny’ . . . .”) (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 
216 (1944)); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 646 (1948) (explaining that “only the most 
exceptional circumstances can excuse discrimination” based on “racial descent”). 
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Supreme Court finds discrimination only if the state acted with 
discriminatory intent in enacting the facially neutral law.27   
Given the racial context of the Equal Protection Clause, how does it apply 
to laws that create sex-based classifications or that use sex-neutral terms but 
have a gendered impact?  For the first hundred years of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s life, the Supreme Court routinely upheld legislation that 
relegated women to secondary status, in opinions replete with separate-
spheres discourse affirming distinct roles for men and women in American 
society.28  Only since the 1970s has the Court acknowledged that the Equal 
Protection Clause is relevant to questions of gender justice.29  The Court 
developed its gender-equality doctrine in an ahistorical manner by analogy 
to its race-equality doctrine,30 establishing a “de facto ERA”31 that judges 
sex-based classifications using a new level of intermediate scrutiny.32  To be 
upheld, sex-based classifications must be substantially related to an important 
government objective.33   
 
 27 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241, 246 (1976) (requiring challengers of facially 
neutral state action demonstrate that the challenged practice was animated by a discriminatory 
purpose). 
 28 See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (upholding the automatic exclusion of women from 
jury duty); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding a prohibition on female bartenders); 
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding limitations on the hours worked by women). 
 29 See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75–77 (1971) (the first Supreme Court decision to invalidate a 
gender classification; using the rational basis test to invalidate a preference for males over females 
as executors of wills). 
 30 Justice Brennan was the first to make this argument.  See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 
682–88 (1973) (concluding that sex-based discrimination is akin to race discrimination in that it is 
based on historical stereotypes and “immutable characteristics” wholly unrelated to one’s ability to 
“contribute to society”)  (plurality opinion). 
 31 Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De 
Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1324 (2006) (quoting Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection 
Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 985 (2002)). 
 32 See United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 531–58 (1996) (applying a form of intermediate 
scrutiny requiring “exceedingly persuasive justification” and ultimately holding as unconstitutional 
the Virginia Military Institute’s all-male admissions policy); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 
U.S. 718, 724–31, 733 (1982) (applying a form of intermediate scrutiny that examined motivating 
biases and stereotypes; holding a state-sponsored all-female nursing school unconstitutional, in part 
because it was based on stereotypes about gender in nursing); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197–
204, 210 (1976) (applying intermediate scrutiny to invalidate a statute prohibiting the sale of beer 
to underage males only); Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643, 653 (1975) (applying a 
heightened standard of scrutiny to invalidate a provision of the Social Security Act giving survivor 
benefits to females only). 
 33 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724).  Some suggest that the VMI case 
introduced “skeptical scrutiny” to sex-based discrimination, which “differs from strict scrutiny only 
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Further, any justification for sex-based classifications must not be based 
on gender-role stereotypes.34  In a long line of equal-protection cases, the 
Court invalidated gender classifications in family law because they reflected 
sexual stereotypes of the separate-spheres tradition that presume, on the one 
hand, breadwinning husbands, and on the other, domesticated wives focused 
on home and married life.35  The Court indicated that the traditional and 
even settled beliefs about women’s proper gender roles in the family and in 
society, far from vindicating discrimination, are now a barometer of 
constitutional invalidity.36  The Court has thus understood “anti-
stereotyping” to be a central aspect of gender equal protection.37   
While the Court subjects overt sex-based classifications to heightened 
scrutiny, in the context of sex it has also adopted a stringent discriminatory 
intent requirement for laws that do not discriminate on their face. In Feeney, 
the Court held that facially neutral state action that has an adverse impact 
on women does not violate equal protection unless it was selected or 
 
in name.”  Anita K. Blair, Constitutional Equal Protection, Strict Scrutiny, and the Politics of Marriage Law, 
47 CATH. U. L. REV. 1231, 1233–35 (1998); see also DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, THE CASE FOR GAY 
RIGHTS: FROM BOWERS TO LAWRENCE AND BEYOND 62 (2005) (positing that “the Supreme 
Court may be raising the level of scrutiny for gender much closer to that of race” after VMI). 
 34 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U.S. 127, 141–42, 146 (1994) (holding that gender-based 
peremptory challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause, particularly where the discrimination 
is informed by gender stereotypes). 
 35  See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725–26, 726 n.14 (noting the “broad range of statutes already invalidated by 
[the] Court” that were based on “simplistic, outdated assumption[s]” about gender); see, e.g.,  Orr 
v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (invalidating under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause a state law provision based on gender stereotypes regarding financial need, that accorded 
ex-wives but not ex-husbands the right to receive alimony); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 
(1977) (invalidating under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause a statute, based 
on gender stereotypes regarding financial need, that required widowers—but not widows—prove 
dependency on their deceased spouses in order to receive OASDI benefits). 
 36 See e.g., Orr, 440 U.S. at 283 (“Where . . . the State’s . . . purposes are as well served by a gender-
neutral classification as one that gender classifies and therefore carries with it the baggage of sexual 
stereotypes, the State cannot be permitted to classify on the basis of sex.”); Craig, 429 U.S. at 198–
99 (holding impermissible the “increasingly outdated misconceptions concerning the role of females 
in the home rather than in ‘the marketplace and world of ideas’”) (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421 
U.S. 7, 15 (1975)). 
 37 The Supreme Court has consistently held that state laws and practices reflecting stereotypical 
assumptions about women’s proper roles are invalid under the Equal Protection Clause.  See David 
H. Gans, Stereotyping and Difference: Planned Parenthood v. Casey and the Future of Sex Discrimination 
Law, 104 YALE L.J. 1875, 1881, 1897 (1995) (noting the centrality of stereotyping analysis to 
modern sex discrimination law under the Equal Protection Clause). 
 
466 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 22:2 
   
 
reaffirmed “at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse 
effects upon an identifiable group.”38   
In sum, the Court’s gender-equality jurisprudence, modeled after its race-
equality paradigm, sounds in formalistic antidiscrimination norms by 
focusing on the purpose and structure of challenged legislation, not on its 
impact, to ensure that state actors are not motivated by stereotypical 
judgments about women.39  This formalist understanding will be discussed in 
greater detail by Divorce as a Formal Gender-Equality Right.40 
Recognizing that the Supreme Court equates discrimination with 
classification, regulatory bodies have wiped out traditional forms of gender-
status legislation and generally avoided justifying facially neutral regulations 
using discredited status-based reasoning.41  As a result, laws today are almost 
universally facially neutral and rationalized in non-discriminatory rhetoric, 
yet many still perpetuate, even aggravate, racial and gender stratification.42   
Thus, for example, absent evidence that state action was animated by a 
discriminatory purpose, many of the most oppressive marital status doctrines 
of the common law—which were originally couched or recently have been 
redefined in facially neutral terms—now survive equal-protection scrutiny.43   
The Supreme Court, however, has failed to modernize its equal-
protection doctrine to rout out bias in such ostensibly neutral state action.44  
 
 38 Personnel Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). 
 39 See Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993) (rejecting the proposition 
that “class-based animus can be determined solely by effect.”); cf. Robin West, Equality Theory, 
Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 45, 61 n.66 (1990) (noting 
that a problem with anti-subordination approaches to Equal Protection Clause is that courts have 
rejected them). 
 40 Karin Carmit Yefet, Divorce as a Formal Gender-Equality Right, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 
April 2020).   
 41 As Reva Siegel has explained, just as the conflicts culminating in the disestablishment of slavery 
and later segregation produced a shift in the justificatory rhetoric of racial status laws, the 
discriminatory purpose doctrine has caused a shift in the forms of state action that perpetuate the 
gender stratification of American society. Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects, 49 
STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1119–29 (1997). 
 42 Id. at 1111, 1131 (demonstrating that the Court’s current interpretation of equal protection 
“continues to authorize forms of state action that contribute to the racial and gender stratification 
of American society.”).  
 43 Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 947, 1024–26 (2002). 
 44 Siegel, supra note 41, at 1141–42.  For an egregious example, see Unites States v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709 
(8th Cir. 1994) (upholding sentencing guidelines that treated the possession of a given amount of 
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Progressive constitutional commentators have thus fiercely attacked the 
discriminatory intent rule as outmoded in the wake of the disestablishment 
of overt forms of race and gender classification,45 calling for a new paradigm 
that would allow equal protection to meaningfully target the contemporary 
forms of subordination of protected groups.46   
B.  A Substantive Understanding of Gender Equality 
The legal literature abounds with proposals to either modify or abrogate 
the discriminatory purpose rule.47  In what follows, this Section considers 
scholarly proposals to analyze facially neutral legislation in accordance with 
an anti-subordination principle48 and to inform equal protection analysis 
based on its historical context.49  Each of these approaches addresses the 
conceptual problems that plague the gender-discrimination paradigm in a 
way that is connected to constitutional text, history, or doctrine. It concludes 
by exploring the emergent doctrine of “due process equality,” a development 
in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence that infuses due process analysis with 
substantive equality concerns.   
1.  The Anti-Subordination Principle  
Prominent constitutional critics and dissenting justices have long called 
for making the substantive value of equality the mediating principle of equal-
protection jurisprudence.  The principle now widely known as “anti-
 
crack cocaine equally to 100 times that amount of powder cocaine, even though over ninety percent 
of defendants possessing crack cocaine were blacks).  
 45 See, e.g., David Kairys, More or Less Equal, 13 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 675, 677 (2004); Carlos A. 
Singer, The Stultification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 13 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 875, 882–83 
(2004); Siegel, supra note 41, at 1135–46; Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of 
Intent: Do We Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151, 1166 (1991). 
 46 Siegel, supra note 41, at 1144. 
 47 See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 945 
(1989) (arguing that the discriminatory purpose standard should be based on a showing of 
impartiality in governmental decision making); Randall L. Kennedy, McClesky v. Kemp: Race, 
Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1419–21, 1424–29 (1988); Sylvia 
A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1005–13 (1984).  
 48 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1514–21 ¶¶ 16–21 (2d ed. 
1988). 
 49 Siegel, supra note 41, at 1141–45.  See generally Siegel, supra note 43. 
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subordination”50 dominates the equality literature.51  Anti-subordinationists 
argue that this approach is more faithful than the Supreme Court’s 
antidiscrimination principle to the American constitutional tradition and the 
civil rights struggle, pointing out that equal protection developed to remedy 
a history of subordination, not just mere classification, against blacks.52  
Accordingly, the anti-subordination principle is less concerned about the 
hidden prejudices of state actors than about the inequalities in group status 
and the social stratification that state action inflicts on disadvantaged groups; 
the persistent reality of unconscious bias makes it essential to have equality 
standards that address policies that, while neutral on their face, are 
discriminatory in effect.53   
To achieve its purpose of disestablishing entrenched forms of group-
based subordination and securing substantive equality, the anti-
subordination understanding of equal protection condemns laws and 
practices that have the effect of creating, perpetuating, or aggravating the 
second-class citizenship of historically oppressed groups.54  For example, 
 
 50 See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, What Is Feminism?, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 413, 416–17 (1994) (discussing the 
centrality of the anti-subordination principle in modern feminist thought); Colker, supra note 25. 
 51 This principle is termed the “group-disadvantaging principle” by Owen Fiss—Fiss, supra note 25, 
at 157—the “antisubjugation principle” by Laurence Tribe—TRIBE, supra note 48, at 1515–16—
and the “equal citizenship” or “anticaste” principle by Cass Sunstein, Kenneth Karst, and Charles 
Lawrence.  See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or 
Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 9 n.2 (2003). 
 52 Anti-subordinationists persuasively demonstrate that the Equal Protection Clause was “drafted 
specifically”—TRIBE, supra note 48, at 1516—to remedy the very evil of subjugation by overturning 
the status of blacks as “a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the 
dominant race.” Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404–405 (1856).  See also JACOBUS 
TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 192–95 (Univ. 
Cal. Press & Cambridge Univ. Press, 1951) (noting that the Equal Protection Clause empowered 
Congress to “legislate upon all matters pertaining to the life, liberty, and property of all of the 
inhabitants of the several states.”); West, supra note 24, at 112. 
 53 See Sylvia A. Law, Where Do We Go from Here? The Fourteenth Amendment, Original Intent, and Present 
Realities, 13 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 691, 697–98 (2004) (arguing that since unconscious sexism 
is “pervasive and often invisible,” constitutional concern about equality “should pay attention to 
effects.”); Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of 
Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 980–81 (1993) (arguing that the intent requirement 
ignores the existence of white race consciousness). 
 54 See Fiss, supra note 25, at 157 (noting that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a law or official 
practice that “aggravates (or perpetuates?) the subordinate position of a specially disadvantaged 
group.”); Owen Fiss, Another Equality, in ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, THE ORIGINS AND FATE 
OF ANTISUBORDINATION THEORY 3–4 (Caranjit Singh ed., 2004) (explaining that under the anti-
subordination principle, certain social practices should be condemned because they “perpetuate 
the subordination of the group of which the individual excluded or rejected is a member.”). 
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unlike antidiscrimination, the anti-subordination principle does not require 
proof of individualized motivation and permits consideration of the group-
based effects of an action.  By disavowing all policies—whether facially 
differentiating or facially neutral—that disproportionately harm members of 
marginalized groups, unless justified by a weighty public purpose,55 anti-
subordination “can tell the difference between benign and invidious 
discrimination.”56   
There are several Supreme Court decisions that reflect the anti-
subordination principle, drawing on concepts of social status or caste to 
interpret equal protection.57  As shown by Jack Balkin and Reva Siegel, anti-
subordination values often have guided the application of the 
antidiscrimination principle in practice.58  In Mississippi University for Women v. 
Hogan, for example, the Court invalidated the state nursing school’s women-
only admission policy on the grounds that it “reflect[ed] archaic and 
stereotypic notions” of “proper” gender roles, thereby perpetuating the 
relegation of women to inferior status.59  The antidiscrimination principle 
alone could not well account for the Hogan decision, as Laurence Tribe 
correctly observes, since the Court faulted the single-sex admission policy not 
only because it discriminated against men, but more so because it reinforced 
the subjugation of women.60   
United States v. Virginia, to take a more recent illustration, similarly infuses 
the Court’s antidiscrimination framework with anti-subordination 
 
 55 For example, the goal of redressing subordination could justify a sex-specific affirmative action.  For 
such anti-subordinationist scholars as Ruth Colker, the goal of anti-subordination is the only 
justification that is permitted to justify a race- or sex-specific policy or action.  Colker, supra note 
25, at 1015. 
 56 Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality 
Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1288–89 (2011). 
 57 For example, in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), the first equal-protection case to reach 
the Court after the Civil War, a unanimous Court viewed equal protection as an “exemption from 
legal discriminations, implying inferiority,” which are “steps towards reducing [blacks] to the 
condition of a subject race.” Id. at 308. 
 58 See generally Balkin & Siegel, supra note 51 (arguing that many of the Court’s equal-protection cases 
explicitly or implicitly vindicate anti-subordination norms within the discourse of anti-
discrimination); see also Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in 
Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1542–43 (2004) (“[C]oncerns of 
subordination shape the concept of classification itself.”). 
 59 Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725, 726 (1981). 
 60 TRIBE, supra note 48, at 1518. 
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concerns.61  Recognizing that equal-protection norms guarantee women the 
full stature of citizenship, not simply the right to individual consideration, the 
Court deemed the male-only admission policy to Virginia Military Institute 
a constitutional wrong for demeaning women and perpetuating their 
inferiority as a group.62    
2.  Historical Foundations for Substantive Gender-Equality Jurisprudence 
The reviewed anti-subordination scholarship developed largely in 
response to the judicial focus on antidiscrimination as the central theme of 
constitutional equality.  This Subsection explores several historically 
grounded theories of substantive gender equality that developed in response 
to the Supreme Court’s ahistorical reliance on the racial-discrimination 
paradigm to guide its gender-equality jurisprudence.  Informed directly by 
struggles with gender oppression, each approach canvassed below represents 
a particular vision of substantive equality that is narrowly focused on gender.   
Lucinda Finely, for one, argues that in order to conceptualize gender 
equality in a way more faithful to the Equal Protection Clause’s history and 
ideals, we should concentrate not on the racial classification cases originating 
in the civil rights movement, but on nineteenth century women’s rights 
activists and their understanding of how the provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment could apply to practices that subordinate women.63  For the 
nineteenth century movement for women’s rights, equal protection was not 
based on formal equal treatment, but on a substantive model of equality.64  
As the nineteenth century “founding mothers” conceived of gender equality, 
“[if a] public act of state officials or a legal restriction or classification, or 
private actions such as violence, or public indifference to private oppressions, 
impairs women’s ability to enjoy all their human rights both equally and 
fully, then the practice presents an equality problem.”65  These activists 
widely accepted as constitutive of equal protection affirmative state 
 
 61 United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
 62 Id. at 534 (“[Sex] classifications may not be used, as they once were . . . to create or perpetuate the 
legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.”). 
 63 Lucinda M. Finley, Putting “Protection” Back in the Equal Protection Clause: Lessons from Nineteenth Century 
Women’s Rights Activists’ Understandings of Equality, 13 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 429 (2004). 
 64 Id. at 432–33. 
 65 Id. at 452. 
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obligations to protect citizens from private violence and to guarantee familial 
rights.66   
Robin West, for another, has argued that the Equal Protection Clause 
must be understood in light of the abolitionist history surrounding its 
adoption.  For her, an abolitionist understanding of gender equality is more 
faithful to both the text and history of the Fourteenth Amendment than 
either the formal antidiscrimination or the substantive anti-subordination 
views of equal protection.67  She understands the Equal Protection Clause as 
a guarantee of “sole state sovereignty,” a right not to be subjugated to the 
whims of a sovereign other than the state and a protection against potentially 
subordinating or enslaving conditions like private violence or economic 
dependence that leave citizens profoundly unequal.68  Under West’s 
abolitionist interpretation, the Equal Protection Clause is “a charter 
protecting our right to be self-governing, autonomous, free of other rulers, 
masters, or superiors, within the confines of the rule of law.”69   
Reva Siegel and Akhil Amar offer a synthetic reading of the Fourteenth 
and Nineteenth Amendments, grounding gender discrimination doctrine in 
the history and normative concerns that prompted the passage of the suffrage 
amendment.70  In the debates over women’s suffrage that began with the 
drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment and concluded with the ratification 
of the Nineteenth Amendment, the battle over women’s right to vote 
centered on marriage.71  Antisuffragists conceived of the female franchise as 
anathematic to the patriarchal family structure and the associated common-
law notions of virtual representation and marital unity.72  Suffragists, 
 
 66 Id. at 448–49. 
 67 West, supra note 24, at 113, 137.  
 68 Id. at 130, 138–39, 143–44 (noting that equal protection “targets states’ refusal to protect citizens 
against profoundly private action which results in insubordination or enslavement . . . .”).   
 69 Id. at 139, 149. 
 70 Siegel, supra note 43, at 959–60; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Concurring and Dissenting, in WHAT ROE V. 
WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID 152, 162–63 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005) (advocating reading the 
Fourteenth Amendment in light of the Nineteenth Amendment, which produces a robust reading 
of women’s equal protection and equal citizenship). 
 71 See generally Siegel, supra note 43, at 952, 981 (showing that suffragists and antisuffragists alike 
anticipated that enfranchising women would free women from laws and institutions that restricted 
their roles in marriage and the market). 
 72 Under this view of marriage, enfranchising women was perceived as both unnecessary and harmful.  
It was believed to be unnecessary in that men were understood as heads of household authorized 
to represent their wives and other dependents in public and private law.  Id. at 981–87; see, e.g., 
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1956 (1868) (noting that women and children should be 
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meanwhile, continuously challenged the common-law doctrines of marital 
status and viewed the demand for the vote as a challenge to the very order of 
coverture.73  Ultimately, the suffragists had the better of the debate.  Indeed, 
in the immediate aftermath of the Nineteenth Amendment’s ratification, 
both the Supreme Court and Congress interpreted the amendment in light 
of the suffrage debates as a constitutional commitment to break from 
patriarchal understandings of the family and from common-law traditions of 
marital status.74  
A synthetic construal of the Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendments 
thus calls for a robust reading of women’s equal protection and equal 
citizenship rights.75  Whereas the Court’s formalist equal-protection 
jurisprudence fails to give special attention to the way the state has regulated 
women’s social position in and through the family, grounding gender-
equality doctrine in the history of the women’s struggle for citizenship rights 
teaches that at the core of gender equality is freedom from subordination in 
or through the family.76  This sociohistorical understanding of gender-
equality doctrine would thus accord heightened scrutiny not only to sex-
based classifications, but also to ostensibly neutral state action regulating 
family life in a way that denies women “full citizenship stature” or that 
perpetuates the “legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.”77   
 
represented by “someone who by reason of domestic or social relations . . . can be fairly said to 
represent [their] interests.”).  
 73 Siegel, supra note 43, at 977–97. 
 74 For example, in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), the Court invalidated a sex-based 
minimum wage law based on the sex equality norm enshrined in the Nineteenth Amendment, 
discussing equality for women in the framework of the suffrage debates and understanding it as 
emancipation from reasoning about women’s roles rooted in the common law of marital status.  Id. 
at 553; see also Siegel, supra note 43, at 1012, 1015–19 (discussing the rulings of several federal and 
state courts that invoked the Nineteenth Amendment as a reason to repudiate or narrowly interpret 
coverture concepts).  In recent years, however, courts have dissociated the suffrage amendment 
from the debates that surrounded its ratification, such that today the Nineteenth Amendment is 
commonly understood as limited to the context of voting.  Id. at 1021–22. 
 75 Amar, supra note 70, at 162. 
 76 By adopting the Nineteenth Amendment, Americans repudiated patriarchal conceptions of the 
family that were rooted in coverture and the common-law traditions that subordinated women to 
men in marriage, understanding the Amendment to augur a shift in gender roles and family 
structure.  See Siegel, supra note 43, at 953, 1007, 1034 (“constitutional guarantees of equal 
citizenship would protect women against regulation that perpetuates traditional understandings of 
the family that are inconsistent with equal citizenship in a democratic polity.”).   
 77 Id. at 1044 (quoting United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 533–534 (1996)). 
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3.  “Due Process Equality”: Substantive Protection for Equal Citizenship and 
Human Dignity 
A gender-equality approach to marital freedom does not solely depend 
on the authority of the Equal Protection Clause.  One of the most significant 
developments in fundamental rights jurisprudence in recent years is the 
grafting of liberty, equality, and dignity norms into substantive due process.78  
Several constitutional commentators have begun to call attention to “the 
ways in which equal citizenship’s antisubordination values” have 
“profoundly influenced the doctrinal growth of substantive due process,” 
commencing in Griswold and culminating in Lawrence79 and Obergefell.80  While 
many canonical fundamental rights decisions are inflected with equality 
concerns,81 the reproductive freedom cases in particular highlight this trend 
of what this Article terms “due process equality.”   
Owen Fiss, along with an impressive line of thinkers,82 has found that the 
seminal abortion case—Roe v. Wade—“makes constitutional sense only if we 
bring to the fore an understanding of the significance of the right to choose 
abortion for the social position of women: as a means of furthering their 
equality.”83  Indeed, the Roe majority’s reasoning that “[m]aternity, or 
 
 78 See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” that Dare Not Speak Its Name, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004) (“[D]ue process and equal protection, far from having 
separate missions and entailing different inquiries, are profoundly interlocked in a legal double 
helix.  It is a single, unfolding tale of equal liberty and increasingly universal dignity.”).  Kenji 
Yoshino refers to the links between equality and liberty as “dignity” claims.  See Kenji Yoshino, The 
New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748–49 (2011); see also id. at 776–83 (describing the 
judicial move toward “liberty-based dignity”).   
 79 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups and 
the Due Process Clause, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 99, 102 (2007). 
 80 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 81 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), considered 
the “true progenitors” of substantive due process doctrine, have been understood to have equality 
dimensions, protecting national minorities and religious minorities, respectively.  See United States 
v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (citing Pierce as relevant for religious 
minorities, and Meyer as relevant for national minorities). 
 82 See, e.g., KENNETH L. KARST, LAW’S PROMISE, LAW’S EXPRESSION: VISIONS OF POWER IN THE 
POLITICS OF RACE, GENDER, AND RELIGION 53, 183 (1993) (“The Griswold and Roe decisions are 
most satisfactorily defended as effectuating the principle of equal citizenship.”).  
 83 Fiss, supra note 50, at 416.  For the rewriting of Roe as a sex equality decision, see generally WHAT 
ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 70.  For a discussion of the evolution of equality-
based arguments for the abortion right, see Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive 
Rights: Their Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815 (2007) (noting that 
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additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and 
future”84 led the dissent to observe that the majority was importing “legal 
considerations associated with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to this case arising under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”85  Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists likewise invoked a gender-equality rationale for the right to 
reproductive freedom,86 suggesting that abortion regulations “[implicate] 
constitutional values of equality as well as privacy.”87   
Planned Parenthood v. Casey expressly imported equality themes into its 
fundamental-rights jurisprudence, recognizing explicitly what had been 
implicit in Roe: “that a constitutional right of due process liberty can rest 
comfortably on grounds sounding in equality.”88  Though situating its 
equality analysis in a discussion of due process liberty rather than equal 
protection,89 the joint opinion “manifestly and repeatedly declares its 
condemnation of women’s status subordination,”90 acknowledging the 
importance of the abortion decision in guaranteeing women full 
participation in society and denouncing abortion-restrictive regulations as 
premised on a narrow vision of women’s customary family roles.91  In 
 
a sex equality standpoint on reproductive rights can be, and is, expressed in a variety of 
constitutional frameworks). 
 84 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
 85 Id. at 173 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 86 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 925 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“The Constitution protects all individuals, male or female, married or 
unmarried, from the abuse of governmental power . . . .”); see also Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of 
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Our cases long 
have recognized that the Constitution embodies a promise that a certain private sphere of 
individual liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach of the government. . . .  That promise 
extends to women as well as to men.”).  
 87 Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal 
Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 263 (1992). 
 88 Kenneth L. Karst, Constitutional Equality as a Cultural Form: The Courts and the Meaning of Sex and Gender, 
38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 513, 534 (2003). 
 89 Only Justice Blackmun located his argument within the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  See Casey, 505 U.S. at 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(arguing that abortion restrictions resting on the assumption that motherhood is women’s “natural” 
role in society implicates the Equal Protection Clause). 
 90 Karst, supra note 79, at 129. 
 91 Casey, 505 U.S. at 856 (“The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life 
of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.”); id. at 912 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Roe is an integral part of a correct 
understanding of both the concept of liberty and the basic equality of men and women.”); id. at 928 
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addition, the opinion invoked dignitary concerns,92 structuring a novel undue 
burden test to demand respect for the dignity of women that equals respect 
shown for the dignity of fetal life.93  Many constitutional scholars accordingly 
read Casey to vindicate not only a right grounded in equality values alone, 
but also a right to dignity.94   
More recently, in Stenberg v. Carhart, the Court further infused its 
substantive due process liberty analysis with equality and dignity concerns: 
“millions [of Americans] fear that a law that forbids abortion would 
condemn many American women to lives that lack dignity, depriving them 
of equal liberty and leading those with least resources to undergo illegal 
abortions with the attendant risks of death and suffering.”95  Finally, Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissent in Gonzales v. Carhart brought equal-protection analysis to 
 
(Blackmun J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“A State’s restrictions on a woman’s right 
to terminate her pregnancy also implicate constitutional guarantees of gender equality.”).  As Justice 
Ginsburg put it, Casey “acknowledged the intimate connection between a woman’s ‘ability to control 
[her] reproductive life’ and her ‘ability . . . to participate equally in the economic and social life of 
the Nation.’”  See Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg to be Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the U.S.: 
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 103, 205–08 (1993); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 386 (1985); 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1199 (1992).  But see 
Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and Payment for Organs, 120 
HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1826 n.66 (2007) (arguing that sex equality “is not the justification that the 
Court has generally given for the abortion right”).    
 92 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.  
 93 See id. at 851, 876 (asserting that the best method of balancing the state’s interest in fetal life and a 
woman’s interest in personal autonomy would be to impose an undue burden test in evaluating the 
constitutionality of abortion regulations); see also Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: 
Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1696 (2008) (arguing that a 
commitment to both the dignity of human life and the dignity of women underlies the Court’s 
undue burden formulation in its Casey and Carhart decisions).  
 94 See Siegel, supra note 83, at 833–34 (internal citations omitted) (reviewing commentary concerning 
liberty and equality values at stake in the Court’s reasoning and situating Casey in the doctrinally 
evolving due process equality reasoning in support of the right to abort); see also Siegel, supra note 
93, at 1696 (“Carhart appeals to human dignity as a reason to allow government to restrict abortion, 
while Casey appeals to human dignity as a reason to prohibit government from interfering with a 
woman's decision whether to become a parent.”); Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An 
Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991, 1050–53 (2007) 
(analyzing the intertwining of liberty and equality values in Casey); Reva B. Siegel, Abortion as a Sex 
Equality Right: Its Basis in Feminist Theory, in MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINIST THEORY AND THE LEGAL 
REGULATION OF MOTHERHOOD (Martha Albertson Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995); Reva 
B. Siegel, “You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby”: Rehnquist’s New Approach to Pregnancy Discrimination in Hibbs, 
58 STAN. L. REV. 1871, 1895–96 (2006). 
 95 530 U.S. 914, 920 (2000). 
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the forefront of fundamental-rights jurisprudence.96  Joined by three other 
justices, she concluded that the abortion right “center[s] on a woman’s 
autonomy to determine her life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship 
stature.”97   
Even outside the abortion context, the Court has relied on equality and 
dignitary concerns to inform its due process analysis.  When guaranteeing 
gay people the due process right to order their sexual lives, the Lawrence Court 
stressed the respect, dignity, and equal social standing that individuals in our 
society are owed.98  In Justice Kennedy’s terms, “[e]quality of treatment and 
the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the 
substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and a 
decision on the latter point advances both interests.”99  Denying homosexuals 
the forms of autonomy accorded to heterosexuals was recognized as a 
simultaneous affront to liberty, dignity, and equality and to the protections 
against subordination that human dignity demands:  
If protected conduct is made criminal and the law which does so remains 
unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma might remain even if it 
were not enforceable as drawn for equal protection reasons.  When 
homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that 
declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to 
discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.  The central 
holding of Bowers . . . demeans the lives of homosexual persons.100   
Lawrence was therefore deeply concerned about social subordination, 
recognizing the essence of equal citizenship as the dignity of full membership 
in society.101  Similarly, in the recent landmark Obergefell case, the Court 
 
 96 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 185 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Justice Ginsburg did not 
just draw upon sex equality principles to justify the abortion right, as in Casey, but she also directly 
invoked equal protection cases to extend the constitutional repudiation of laws reflecting or 
enforcing traditional sex-role stereotypes. 
 97 Id. at 172.  
 98 The Court repeatedly invokes the concept of individual dignity.  See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (“[A]dults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their 
homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.”); id. at 574 (discussing 
“personal dignity and autonomy” and quoting Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (joint opinion of O’Connor, 
Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.)). 
 99 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562–75.  
 100 Id. 
 101 Siegel, supra note 93, at 1704 (“[The Court] speaks passionately of the dignity of autonomous 
decisionmaking, insisting that the Constitution guarantees an individual freedom to choose her own 
life course and not to live as the instrument of another’s will. Justice Kennedy is eloquent also in 
describing the protections against subordination that human dignity requires, declaring the 
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further devoted considerable judicial energy to expounding the close ties 
between the liberty of the Due Process Clause and the equality of the Equal  
Protection Clause, stressing the interlocking nature of liberty and equality 
that crystalizes a right to “equal dignity” in same-sex marriages.102   
The intersection of principles of liberty, dignity, and equality under the 
Due Process Clause is far less constraining than the Supreme Court’s equal-
protection jurisprudence, which sounds in antidiscrimination norms and 
focuses on the purpose and structure of challenged legislation rather than its 
impact.103  “Due process equality,” to the contrary, stresses anti-
subordination norms, which respond to problems of social stratification, 
press substantive measures of equal citizenship, and impugn dignitary 
injuries of state action that enforce the subordinate status of relatively 
powerless groups.104   
Part I has demonstrated that gender equality is a constitutional mandate 
protected under various jurisprudential and scholarly doctrinal frameworks.  
Parts II and III consider marital freedom as a substantive gender-equality right 
by applying the anti-subordination principle, historical interpretations of 
 
Constitution guarantees persons freedom from the denigration and humiliation of treatment as 
second-class citizens.”); see also Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Loving Lawrence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 
1447, 1449 (2004) (“Lawrence is a case about liberty that has important implications for the 
jurisprudence of equality . . . .”); Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, 
Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 98 (2003) (“The perception that the Texas anti-sodomy 
statute imposes second-class citizenship on an identifiable class of persons . . . is at the core of 
Lawrence’s analysis.”). 
 102 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602–04, 2608 (2015). 
 103 See Yoshino, supra note 78, at 781 (noting the function of due process equality as “an end run around 
bars on disparate impact”); see also Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, the New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1491, 1542 (2002) (arguing that the “fundamental rights strand of equal protection” analysis enables 
the Court to look beyond facial neutrality and look to the real-world impact of the laws it analyzes); 
Reva B. Siegel, Roe’s Roots: The Women’s Rights Claims That Engendered  Roe, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1875, 
1903 (2010) (stating that the due process analysis in Casey tied the “constitutional protection for 
women’s abortion decision to the understanding . . . that the government cannot use law to enforce 
traditional sex roles on women”).   
 104 Indeed, like the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause was designed at least in part to 
“‘abolish[] all class legislation in the States and do[] away with the injustice of subjecting one caste 
of persons to a code not applicable to another.” Balkin, supra note 12, at 852 (quoting CONG. 
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2764–68 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard)). 
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substantive equality, and the Supreme Court’s emerging doctrine of “due 
process equality.”105 
II.  MARITAL FREEDOM AS A SUBSTANTIVE GENDER-EQUALITY RIGHT 
To establish the link between the right to marital freedom and substantive 
gender equality, this Part reveals the institution of marriage as a site of status 
inequality, as it has been historically regulated and as it is currently 
experienced by numerous women.  This story, of subordination facilitated by 
marriage laws and reinforced through divorce laws, demands a right to 
marital freedom according to all visions of substantive equality identified.   
The state has long enforced women’s subordinate status in society 
through laws regulating the family.106  Correspondingly, while feminist 
theories differ in many regards, “[a] continuous ideological thread of feminist 
theory through time and across continents is the common understanding that 
male power is linked to the subjugation and servitude of women in the 
home.”107  As this Part will show, the law has played a key role in enforcing 
and maintaining status inequalities between husband and wife, which persist 
to the present day in varying degrees.  It is fueled by and in turn fuels gender 
discrimination in society at large, situating marriage at “the heart of 
politics”108 for feminists of all stripes.109  Precisely because of the contribution 
 
 105 In addition to being a substantive equality right, marital freedom is also a formal equality right.  See 
Karin Carmit Yefet, Divorce as a Formal Gender-Equality Right, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 
April 2020).   
 106 G. Kristian Miccio, Exiled from the Province of Care: Domestic Violence, Duty and Conceptions of State 
Accountability, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 111, 152 (2005); Siegel, supra note 43, at 1036.  
 107 Kathleen Mahoney, Theoretical Perspectives on Women’s Human Rights and Strategies for Their 
Implementation, 21 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 799, 800 (1996); see also Post & Siegel, supra note 7 
(“[F]eminists often disagreed about the conditions of women’s subordination, but there were certain 
matters about which they spoke with near unanimity. A core premise of the emergent feminist 
movement was that women’s claim to equal rights with men entailed a challenge to the social 
organization of the family.”). 
 108 Mahoney, supra note 107, at 801. 
 109 Indeed, all major social contract theorists understand the institution of marriage as central to female 
subordination.  See Katherine O’Donovan, Marriage: A Sacred Union or Profane Love Machine?, 1 
FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 75, 88 (1993); Mahoney, supra note 107, at 801 (noting that based on their 
shared understanding of the home as a locus for women’s oppression, feminist theories define the 
political very differently from theories developed from a male perspective, and that this idea is well-
expressed in the slogans, “the personal is political”); see also Frances E. Olsen, The Family and The 
Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1505 (1983); OKIN, supra note 4, 
at 125–26; Martha Albertson Fineman, Why Marriage?, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 239, 246 (2001) 
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of marriage to gender hierarchy in family and society, a strict divorce 
regime—even one that does not expressly differentiate between the sexes—
adversely impacts women; the effect, if not the intent, is substantive gender 
inequality.   
A.  Marital Subordination in Historical Perspective  
Marriage, as it was regulated from this nation’s formation through the 
lesser part of the twentieth century, visited tremendous harms upon women.  
Upon the founding of the United States, men declared their independence 
from the English king, but clung to laws that made them “the kings of their 
own castle.”110  A legal regime of official discrimination and exploitation, the 
common law of marital status fostered relationships based on dependence 
and domination rather than equality and interdependence.  The restrictive 
laws of divorce further constrained women’s place both at home and in 
society; as feminists of the time saw it, divorce restrictions were among the 
most powerful sources of women’s subordination and gender inequality.   
Upon marriage, the law treated women as “civilly dead,” deeming their 
legal existence “suspended,” “incorporated,” and “consolidated” into the 
legal existence of their husbands.111  The compulsion to assume their 
husbands’ names was an obvious marker of married women’s loss of their 
separate identity.112  As documented amply by historians of marriage, the 
coverture doctrine structured marriage to give husbands authority over their 
 
(feminist family theorists have demonstrated that marriage is a public institution); CATHARINE 
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 191 (1989); Robert C. Post, Three 
Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2098 (2001); KATE MILLETT, SEXUAL POLITICS 33, 36 (1969) 
(arguing that marriage is “the keystone of the stratification system, the social mechanism by which 
it is maintained.”). 
 110 EVAN GERSTMANN, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 63 (2017). 
 111 Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude, and the Thirteenth Amendment, 
4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 207, 207, 208 n.9 (1991) (the metaphor of “women as slaves” referred to 
the status and condition of women upon marriage).  Accounts of marital advice women received 
were even worse, speaking “even more forthrightly about the wife’s status as a subordinate member 
of the relationship.”  Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 
YALE L.J. 2117, 2145 (1996). 
 112 McConnell, supra note 111, at 249 (showing that women were legally compelled to adopt their 
husbands’ surnames).  Even throughout the twentieth century, several states interpreted their laws 
to require that married women assume their husband’s surnames for various purposes.  See, e.g., 
Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217, 222–23 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff’d per curiam, 405 U.S. 970 
(1972) (finding that Alabama’s law requiring a woman to assume her husband’s surname upon 
marriage had a rational basis and furthered a legitimate state interest). 
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wives in almost all aspects of the relationship.113  Wives owed their husbands 
strict obedience in all matters,114 along with sexual and domestic services, 
and they could not sue their husbands for mistreatment.115  The common-
law doctrine of marital unity further worked to deprive wives of access to and 
ownership of income and property brought into or accumulated during the 
marriage—civil disabilities that greatly exacerbated women’s already 
substantial economic and social dependence on their husbands.  Anything 
that once belonged to a wife became her husband’s property, and some 
commentators go so far as to suggest that a wife herself was viewed as her 
husband’s property.116   
While the common law of marital status limited wives’ capacity for 
citizenship, it expanded husbands’ citizenship stature, promoting the man’s 
 
 113 For an overview of common-law rules governing marital status in the antebellum period, see 
NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK 47–55, 70–112 (1982); NANCY COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A 
HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 9–23 (2000); LINDA K. KERBER, NO 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES 8–15 (1998).  For an overview of other historical periods, 
see, e.g., Linda McClain, “God’s Created Order,” Gender Complementarity, and the Federal Marriage 
Amendment, 20 BYU J. PUB. L. 313, 339 (2006); Hendrik Hartog, Marital Exits and Marital Expectations 
in Nineteenth Century America, 80 GEO. L.J. 95, 129 (1991) (to be married in the nineteenth century 
meant that “one assumed the character of a husband or a wife and that, in consequence, one was 
joined in a permanent relationship of power and submission”); Siegel, supra note 41, at 1114 (“the 
common law organized the ‘domestic’ relations of husband/wife and master/servant as relations 
of governance and dependence, with the law specifying the rights and obligations of superior and 
inferior parties”); Herma Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview of Women’s Rights 
and Family Law in the United States During the Twentieth Century, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2017, 2018 (2000); 
Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1462–65 (1992) (discussing the 
legal implications of the marital unity doctrine in the past and even at present). 
 114 Nancy F. Cott, Divorce and the Changing Status of Women in Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts, 33 WM. & 
MARY Q. 586, 611–12 (1976); Reva B. Siegel, Valuing Housework: Nineteenth-Century Anxieties About the 
Commodification of Domestic Labor, 41 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1437, 1440 (1998) (noting that the wife’s 
duty in common law was to submit to and serve her husband). 
 115 See generally DAVID GALENSON, WHITE SERVITUDE IN COLONIAL AMERICA: AN ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS (1981); STEPHEN INNES, WORK AND LABOR IN EARLY AMERICA (1988) (analyzing 
labor relationships and arrangements across groups in early America). 
 116 See, e.g., HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN 
THE UNITED STATES 106 (1988) (finding that once married, a woman was deprived of control over 
all property she had owned beforehand); Blanche Crozier, Marital Support, 15 B.U. L. REV. 28 (1935) 
(noting that at the English common law, “the wife was, in economic relationship to the husband, 
his property”); Isabel Marcus, Reflections on the Significance of the Sex/Gender System: Divorce Law Reform 
in New York, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 55, 64–65 (1987) (describing how marriage served as a bar to 
formal access to all forms of property for women); Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman’s 
Rights Claims Concerning Wives’ Household Labor, 1850–1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1082 (1994) (showing 
that marriage gave the husband the use of the wife’s real property, personality, and services). 
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role as head of household, economic provider, and political representative.117  
At common law, a husband enjoyed the right to make all decisions for the 
family unit and to supervise his wife’s actions, control her domestic labor,118 
dominate her body and sexuality,119 determine whether she would bear 
children, and physically chastise her if she defied his authority.120  This 
regime of gender hierarchy continued to be legally enforced and judicially 
exalted well into the twentieth century.121 
Importantly, the structural inequalities built into the institution of 
marriage were mandatory and uniform.  The state defined marriage as 
comprised of a husband-provider and wife-dependent, and individuals could 
not contract out of these sex-role prescriptions.122  Over and over again, 
courts refused to give legal effect to private agreements to alter the gendered 
 
 117 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring) (“So firmly fixed was this 
sentiment in the founders of the common law that it became a maxim of that system of 
jurisprudence that a woman had no legal existence separate from her husband, who was regarded 
as her head and representative in the social state . . . .”); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *432–33 (describing how a husband was considered superior to his wife and could 
control her as he would his servants or children). 
118 Naomi Cahn, Faithless Wives and Lazy Husbands: Gender Norms in Nineteenth-Century Divorce Law, 2002 
U. ILL. L. REV. 651, 686 (2002).  See generally Elizabeth B. Clark, Matrimonial Bonds: Slavery and Divorce 
in Nineteenth-Century America, 8 L. & HIST. REV. 25 (1990) (describing how the position of women in 
nineteenth century marriages was comparable to that of an individual in bondage). 
 119 Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CALIF. L. REV 1373 (2000); 
Marybeth Herald, A Bedroom of One’s Own: Morality and Sexual Privacy After Lawrence v. Texas, 16 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 13 (2004).  
 120 Husbands enjoyed the right to physically chastise wives, a right that knew no meaningful limits 
because courts refused to intervene “to prevent the deplorable spectacle of the exhibition of similar 
cases in our courts of justice.”  Bradley v. State, 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 156, 158 (Miss. 1824); see also 
Amy Eppler, Battered Women and the Equal Protection Clause: Will the Constitution Help Them When the 
Police Won’t?, 95 YALE L.J. 788, 792 (1986) (finding that a husband had a right to physically chastise 
his wife as a corollary to his right to rule the home at common law). 
 121 See, e.g., Chapman v. Mitchell, 44 A.2d, 392, 393 (1945) (asserting that male is the “master of his 
household”, the “managing head, with control and power to preserve the family relation … and to 
guide their conduct.”).  As recently as the 1960s, the Supreme Court still insisted in a unanimous 
opinion that notwithstanding the recent “enlightened emancipation of women,” they are “still 
regarded as the center of home and family life.”  Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61–62 (1961). 
 122 American courts have always refused to uphold marriage contracts that varied or particularized the 
traditional incidents of marriage, most notably the reciprocal marital duties of support and 
provision of domestic services, as well as husband’s privileges to determine the residence and 
domicile of the couple and to give his name to family members.  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Higgason, 
516 P.2d 289 (Cal. 1973) (failing to enforce a prenuptial agreement where husband and wife waived 
rights to support); Watkins v. Watkins, 143 Cal. App. 3d. 651, 654–55 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) 
(examining the rule that a married woman could not contract with her husband regarding domestic 
services incidental to marital status). 
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terms of the traditional marriage contract.123  This contractual disability in 
turn helped perpetuate gender hierarchy within marriage.124   
The marriage contract was not only non-modifiable; it was also 
unenforceable.  Married women were unable to enforce even the sparse 
protections that marriage afforded.  Courts assiduously refused to intervene 
so long as a couple remained married, no matter how grossly the husband 
ignored his marital duties or abused his marital prerogatives.125  The result 
in all too many cases was that married women were forced to endure a life 
of submission and accept their imposed domesticity.126  It is little wonder that 
ever since the emergence of feminism in the United States, injustice within 
marriage has been a rallying cry.  Antebellum feminists fiercely attacked the 
marital institution for giving husbands “unlimited power” while subsuming 
wives’ wills and denying them full citizenship.127  Many abolitionist and 
feminist activists described marriage as bondage or enslavement, a pointed 
reference to the legal trappings of the institution and the physical and 
emotional relations between husband and wife.128  As they insisted, 
egalitarian marriage must be an inalienable human right.129  Throughout, 
the laws of divorce played a complementary role.   
 
 
 
 
 123 Courts feared that “giving legal sanction to marital bargaining would empower wives in ways that 
threatened the customary distribution of wealth and work in marriage.”  Siegel, supra note 114, at 
1449.  
 124 Marjorie M. Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 
207, 271 (1982). 
 125 Illustrative of the dependency of wives and the tyranny of their men under the traditional marriage 
contract, unenforceable in court, is the paradigmatic Nebraska case, McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 
336, 342 (Neb. 1953) (refusing to consider a wife’s suit against her husband for inadequate support 
because the living standards of a family are for the household, and not the courts, to decide).  See 
Shultz, supra note 124, at 234 (noting that the result in McGuire “is so common that commentators 
treat the unenforceability of support obligations during marriage as a given of marital law”). 
 126 Naomi R. Cahn, The Moral Complexities of Family Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 225, 246–47 (1997); see also 
RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN (OUT)LAW: SURVIVAL UNDER THE RULE OF LAW 124–27 (1992). 
 127 KERBER, supra note 113, at 12; MCCLAIN, supra note 2, at 58.  
 128 COTT, supra note 113, at 57–68; MCCLAIN, supra note 127, at 58; Clark, supra note 118, at 30–31. 
 129 Peggy Cooper Davis, Neglected Stories and the Lawfulness of Roe v. Wade, 28 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 
299, 324 (1993) (noting that influential women’s rights advocates in the nineteenth century deemed 
the right of egalitarian, non-patriarchal marriage inalienable). 
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1.  The Complementary Functions of Divorce Restrictions in Enforcing Women’s 
Subordinate Status   
The patriarchal construction of marriage required a strict divorce 
regime.130  Any right to renounce husbandly authority constituted a direct 
threat to the coverture doctrine, defying the notion that a married couple 
represents a single entity controlled by the husband.131  As one scholar put it, 
“the old common law fiction that husband and wife were one and the 
husband was the one could no longer hold quite the same authority once 
divorce challenged the male-dominated corporatism of marriage.”132   
Beyond the goal of shoring up common-law marriage, divorce rights were 
strictly limited to preserve male honor.  Marriage played a crucial role in 
conferring—and confirming—masculinity, such that a man’s failure to 
establish himself as a dominating husband undermined his image as a 
sovereign capable of participating in the business of governance.133  For a 
man, therefore, divorce was considered “a disaster, a source of overwhelming 
shame.”134  Viewed thus, it is easy to understand why divorce law managed 
to remain gender-neutral for much of American history.  Women bore such 
a disproportionate share of the burdens of strict exit rules, while men had 
little need to escape marriage and much interest in maintaining it.  Hence, 
laws that were sex-blind in theory, privileged men and manifestly 
disadvantaged women in practice.135   
 
 130 GWYNN DAVIS & MERVYN MURCH, GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE 69 (1988) (the freedom to leave 
through divorce undermines male-dominated and male-oriented marriage); OKIN, supra note 4, at 
129–30.  
 131 Herma Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview of Women’s Rights and Family Law 
in the United States During the Twentieth Century, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2017, 2032 (2000). 
 132 NORMA BASCH, FRAMING AMERICAN DIVORCE: FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION 
TO THE VICTORIANS 42 (1999). 
 133 STEVEN NOCK, MARRIAGE IN MEN’S LIVES 58–59 (1998) (explaining the important role of 
marriage in conferring masculinity in all ages and the respect and social recognition that men 
receive from being married); see also MCCLAIN, supra note 2, at 135 (2006) (arguing that marriage is 
a “central site in which men define and display their masculinity,” affording them social recognition 
and respect). 
 134 HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 101 (2000). 
 135 For example, Thomas Jefferson, a staunch advocate of divorce, envisioned marital freedom as a 
remedy for women: while a husband had “many ways of rendering his domestic affairs agreeable, 
by Command or desertion,” a wife was “confined [and] subject”; the freedom of divorce would 
restore “to women their natural right to equality.”  Frank L. Dewey, Thomas Jefferson’s Notes on 
Divorce, 39 WM. & MARY Q. 212, 219 (1982).  
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Ultimately, divorce restrictions were the manifestation of a society unable 
or unwilling to see women in any role other than that of wife and mother.136  
In a world in which wifehood was the defining characteristic of womanhood, 
not merely one of its incidents, a unilateral no-fault right to divorce was 
simply inconceivable.137  Even as many jurisdictions began to enlarge the 
gamut exit options from marriage, the fault grounds they enacted actively 
reified sex-role expectations during marriage.138  This Article’s companion, 
focusing on divorce as a formal gender-equality right, will analyze how fault 
restrictions framed a deeply hierarchical vision of marital relations by rigidly 
policing gender-stereotypical behavior.139   
It is little wonder, then, that liberal divorce has long been associated with 
women’s most basic rights.140  By the nineteenth century, feminists well 
understood marriage as a gender-subordination mechanism and divorce as 
an anti-subordination right that secures values of equal citizenship for 
women.   
2.  Toward a Feminist Understanding of the Equal Protection Clause: Rights of 
Exit in Early Feminist Theory  
If we interpret the Equal Protection Clause based on the historical 
understandings and experiences of its feminist predecessors and 
contemporaries, as some constitutional scholars challenge us to do, then 
ostensibly sex-neutral limitations on divorce are a potent violation of gender 
 
 136 Eppler, supra note 120, at 802; Kenneth L. Karst, Woman’s Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447, 458. 
 137 Nora J. Lauerman, A Step Toward Enhancing Equality, Choice, and Opportunity to Develop in Marriage and 
at Divorce, 56 CINCINNATI L. REV. 493, 510 n. 66 (1987) (“Traditionally, the law was premised on 
the stereotypic assumption that a married woman’s only acceptable place was in the home, that her 
only truly legitimate role was that of homemaker/mother.”). 
 138 OKIN, supra note 4, at 130; LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE 
UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMICAL CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN 
AMERICA 2 (1987); Cahn, supra note 14, at 660.   
 139 Karin Carmit Yefet, Divorce as a Formal Gender-Equality Right, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 
April 2020).   
 140 J. HERBIE DIFONZO, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE: THE POPULAR AND LEGAL CULTURE OF 
DIVORCE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 14 (1997) (arguing that divorce has been perceived 
as a “woman’s issue” in the United States); BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE 
CULTURE: RETHINKING OUR COMMITMENTS TO MARRIAGE AND FAMILY 16 (1998) (also noting 
the popular perception of divorce as a concern exclusive to women); Brown, supra note 3, at 248 
(noting that a liberal right to divorce was a feminist issue since the early days of the country); Cahn, 
supra note 126, at 230 (divorce was historically associated with women’s independence and 
liberation). 
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equality.141  Indeed, nineteenth century feminists vociferously advocated 
liberalized divorce rules,142 cautioning that strict limitations on exit resulted 
in the “subjugation of wives to domination by their husbands.”143  Their 
constant refrain analogizing marriage to slavery virtually compelled their 
audiences to contemplate divorce as a form of emancipation.144  
Elizabeth Cady Stanton was a particularly vocal—and influential—
champion of liberal divorce,145 exclaiming with characteristic eloquence that 
“[t]here is no other human slavery that knows such depths of degradations 
as a wife chained to a man whom she neither loves nor respects, no other 
slavery so disastrous in its consequences on the race, or to individual respect, 
growth and development.”146  According to Stanton and other liberal 
feminists, one of the most important tenets of freedom and emancipation for 
women were “self-ownership within marriage and a right to divorce if the 
marriage became degrading.”147  Liberal divorce laws were for oppressed 
wives, Stanton often stated, “what Canada was for Southern slaves.”148   
 
 141 Finley, supra note 63, at 449 (2004). 
 142 NELSON MANFRED BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 87–88, 93–115 (1962); MAX RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE, AND THE 
LAW 38–39 (1972) (“Reform of divorce laws became a tenet of the aggressive feminist movement 
of the mid-nineteenth century”); GLENDA RILEY, DIVORCE: AN AMERICAN TRADITION 73–77, 
115–16 (1991). 
 143 RHEINSTEIN, supra note 142, at 43. 
 144 Clark, supra note 118, at 34.  For example, Elizabeth Stanton used the paradigms of slavery and 
freedom to describe the condition of women within marriage.  Id. at 26. 
 145 Stanton’s writings on divorce are scattered in many sources.  See, e.g., ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, 
HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 716–22, 738–42, 860–61 (1881); Elizabeth Cady Stanton, 
Address Before the Judiciary Comm. of the N.Y. S. on the Divorce Bill (Feb. 8, 1861), available at 
https://www.loc.gov/item/mss412100063/ [hereinafter Stanton, Address on the Divorce Bill] 
(documenting Stanton’s speech before the New York Senate on the importance of divorce for 
equality); Elizabeth Cady Stanton, On Marriage and Divorce, Address at the Decade Meeting (Oct. 
20, 1870), in A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL WOMAN’S RIGHTS MOVEMENT, FOR TWENTY 
YEARS 59 (Paulina W. Davis ed., Journeymen Printers’ Co-Operative Ass’n 1871) (transcribing 
Stanton’s speech on marriage and divorce). 
 146 THE ELIZABETH CADY STANTON-SUSAN B. ANTHONY READER 133 (Ellen Carol DuBois ed., rev. 
ed., 1992). 
 147 Clark, supra note 144, at 34; see also id. at 36–37 (documenting examples of Stanton’s making these 
remarks in her speeches and writings).  
 148 See, e.g., Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Divorce Versus Domestic Warfare, in DIVORCE: THE FIRST DEBATES 
560–61 (David J. Rothman & Sheila M. Rothman eds., 1987) (arguing that because the abolition 
of slavery precluded the proposition that people are property, women should not be viewed as the 
property of their husbands and thus liberal divorce laws should be the norm); Elizabeth Cady 
Stanton, The Need of Liberal Divorce Laws, 139 N. AM. REV. 234, 243 (1884); Tracy A. Thomas, 
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The women who gathered for the first U.S. women’s rights convention, 
held in Seneca Falls in 1848, identified “marital bondage” and restrictions 
on exit as major sources of gender subordination.149  The Declaration of 
Sentiments they issued proclaimed that men have “so framed the laws of 
divorce, as to what shall be the proper causes of divorce . . . as to be wholly 
regardless of the happiness of women—the law, in all cases, going upon a 
false supposition of the supremacy of man, and giving all power into his 
hands.”150  Accordingly, feminist leaders demanded “complete freedom of 
either party at any time to terminate the marriage relationship”151 as critical 
to cultivating equality, dignity, and partnership for women within 
marriage.152   
The activist work, legislative reform efforts, and public speeches on 
divorce that followed the Seneca Falls Convention advocated an end to 
divorce laws that disparately impacted women and to state tolerance of 
private oppression and violence in marriage.153  At the Tenth National 
Women’s Rights Convention in 1860, for example, Stanton advocated no-
fault divorce to end “legalized prostitution of coerced marital intercourse and 
unwilling maternity.”154  In her 1861 appeal to the New York legislature to 
liberalize divorce law, Stanton argued that restricting divorce to specific 
grounds especially burdens women and often confines them to a life of 
degradation, bodily harm, and economic dependence.155  As she saw it, 
divorce-restrictive regulations were a necessary step “in order to establish 
 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton on the Federal Marriage Amendment: A Letter to the President, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 
137, 139–40 (2005). 
 149 JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER, AND INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN 139 (1991) 
(citing THE REVOLUTION, Oct. 27, 1870, at 264). Women’s activists complained that the laws of 
marriage and divorce were framed to benefit men and entrap women within the oppressive 
institution of marriage.  Clark, supra note 144, at 25. 
 150 Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions (Seneca Falls Convention, 1848), reprinted in UP FROM 
THE PEDESTAL: SELECTED WRITINGS IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FEMINISM 185 (Aileen S. 
Kraditor ed., 1968); see also THE BIRTH OF AMERICAN FEMINISM: THE SENECA FALLS 
CONVENTION OF 1848, at 87 (Virginia Bernhard & Elizabeth Fox-Genovese eds., 1995). 
 151 MAX RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE, AND THE LAW 40 (1972). 
 152 NELSON MANFRED BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 87–92 (1962); KATHLEEN BARRY, SUSAN B. ANTHONY: A BIOGRAPHY OF A SINGULAR 
FEMINIST 137 (1988); Clark, supra note 118, at 26–29.  
 153 Finley, supra note 63, at 443. 
 154 Ellen Carol DuBois, Outgrowing the Compact of the Fathers: Equal Rights, Woman Suffrage, and the United 
States Constitution 1820–1878, in A LESS THAN PERFECT UNION: ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON 
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 104, 111 (Jules Lobel ed., 1988). 
 155 See Stanton, Address on the Divorce Bill, supra note 145, at 9; Finley, supra note 63, at 444. 
 
February 2020] DIVORCE AS A SUBSTANTIVE GENDER-EQUALITY RIGHT 487 
   
 
man’s authority over woman.”156  Stanton and Susan B. Anthony devoted 
numerous editorials in their weekly newspaper to advocating free availability 
of marital freedom.157   
In short, “‘She’ The People”—the women’s rights movement that 
supported the vision of freedom and equality encapsulated in the Fourteenth 
Amendment—understood liberal divorce as a substantive equality right, 
critical for ameliorating the persisting subordination of women.   
Concededly, not all feminists signed onto the divorce agenda,158 but the 
“case made by radical feminists for a thorough-going overhaul of divorce and 
family law framed an agenda that eventually became well accepted by 
reformers in the post-Civil War era.”159  Indeed, the Stantonian agenda for 
greater gender equality in marriage and for a no-fault right of exit as 
prerequisites for substantive gender equality became “the dominant way”160 
of viewing marriage and divorce and contributed to the egalitarian legal 
changes that followed.   
B.  Legal Equality Versus Marital Reality: Gender Hierarchy in Contemporary 
Marriages  
This Section focuses on the institution of contemporary marriages, 
contrasting legal equality with marital reality.  As the analysis will document, 
despite legal developments in women’s position in family and society, the 
 
 156 Finley, supra note 63, at 444 (quoting Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Home Life, in THE ELIZABETH CADY 
STANTON-SUSAN B. ANTHONY READER, supra note 146, at 131–38). 
 157 BLAKE, supra note 142, at 99; WILLIAM L. O’NEIL, DIVORCE IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 206 
(1967). 
 158 Women’s advocates were not as unified on questions of marriage as they were on, say, the issue of 
suffrage.  As Katharine Bartlett correctly notes, pro-marriage feminists disfavored divorce “in part 
because it would result in their being cast off beyond their primes when their prospects for 
remarriage were bleak.”  Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminism and Family Law, 33 FAM. L.Q. 475, 477 
(1999); see also Kay, supra note 14, at 2027 (discussing the different views leaders of the nineteenth 
century women’s movement had on divorce); see also Clark, supra note 118, at 25–26, 47 (explaining 
that divorce was a complex and divisive issue for feminists throughout the nineteenth century, and 
that many feminists spoke of divorce reluctantly out of fear of being branded as anti-marriage or 
anti-family or out of concern that Stanton’s vision of liberal divorce would taint the quest for 
suffrage).  For the concerns of both pro-divorce and pro-marriage nineteenth-century feminists, see 
BASCH, supra note 132, at 68–80; MIRIAM GURKO, THE LADIES OF SENECA FALLS: THE BIRTH 
OF THE WOMEN’S RIGHTS MOVEMENT 202–06 (1974). 
 159 Bartlett, supra note 158, at 477–78. 
 160 Id. at 484; see Clark, supra note 118, at 26, 43 (noting how many ideas central to Stanton’s work 
have become dominant in modern society). 
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shadow of the patriarchal family still hovers over modern marriages, 
profoundly shaping husband-wife relationships and women’s overall status.  
Against this backdrop, liberal divorce is revealed as a substantive equality 
right of constitutional significance, given the close ties between emancipation 
from marital subordination and the guarantees of equal citizenship.   
1.  Egalitarian Legal Rhetoric: The Modern Transformation of Marital Status Law  
The early women’s rights movement, which protested against the 
hierarchical strictures of marriage, was in large part responsible for the 
incremental reform of marital status law beginning in the second half of the 
nineteenth century.161  As Reva Siegel has shown in her work on nineteenth 
century marriage law, women’s demands for autonomy and equality in 
marriage slowly began to find resonance with state legislatures, which in turn 
modified many aspects of common-law coverture.162  Thus, marriage law 
slowly resurrected women from their civil deaths,163 and divorce law became 
more liberalized, at least in part thanks to feminist demands.164   
Well into the second half of the twentieth century, however, the legal 
system still continued to allocate privileges and entitlements with respect to 
marriage and divorce in a manner that perpetuated overt gender 
 
 161 Siegel, supra note 41, at 1116–17 (noting that by the 1850s, the woman’s rights movement was 
meeting in national and regional conventions and circulating legislative petitions to protest the 
common law of marriage).  
 162 See Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives’ Rights to Earnings, 1860–
1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2149–68 (1994) (describing reform in nineteenth-century New York); 
Siegel, supra note 41, at 1117 (noting that towards the end of the century women were able to engage 
in third party transactions); Siegel, supra note 111, at 2119 (describing efforts the American feminist 
movement of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries took to secure wives’ equality with their 
husbands).  For reform in other jurisdictions see Richard H. Chused, Late Nineteenth Century Married 
Women’s Property Law: Reception of the Early Married Women’s Property Acts by Courts and Legislatures, 29 
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 3, 3–5 (1985); Joseph Warren, Husband’s Rights to Wife’s Services (pts. 1–2), 38 
HARV. L. REV. 421, 622 (1925). 
 163 For a volume of essays describing various nineteenth-century reforms of marital property and 
contract law, see Domestic Relations and Law, in 3 HISTORY OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES: 
HISTORICAL ARTICLES ON WOMEN’S LIVES AND ACTIVITIES (Nancy F. Cott ed., 1992). 
 164 Rigby, supra note 13, at 562 (noting that in the mid-1800s divorce laws were liberalized due to 
attempts to establish equal rights for women); DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX 
DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 28 (1991) (as the century progressed, both legislative and judicial 
attitudes toward divorce became more liberal, partly in response to feminist demands); see also 
Bartlett, supra note 158, at 478. 
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hierarchy.165  Only since the Supreme Court imported gender-equality 
concerns into its equal protection jurisprudence have the statute books 
largely purged explicit references to sex roles and stereotypes.166  Gender 
equality became the new organizing principle of family law, as the legal 
system reconceived spouses and their family responsibilities in sex-neural 
terminology167 and granted them a liberal right of marital exit free of fault or 
spousal consent considerations.168   
While the attainment of gender equality initially was not a stated goal of 
the no-fault reform efforts in California—the first state to legalize no-fault 
divorce169—feminists in several other states became deeply involved in 
pushing for a more liberal divorce regime.170  The elimination of fault 
 
 165 For example, even after the Married Women’s Property Acts eliminated aspects of a husband’s 
legal control over his wife’s property, they did not eliminate the other elements of the marital 
contract, such as the wife’s duty to obey and provide domestic service.  Wives also still lacked 
property rights in their household labor, which remained their husbands’ by marital right; in all 
states, the common law still disabled a wife from making an enforceable contract with her husband 
for compensation for the labor she performed for their family.  “Partial capacity” thus continued 
to be the defining reality of wives’ lives in nineteenth-century family law.  See MCCLAIN, supra note 
2, at 59–60 (exploring shifts in the perception of marriage from the time of the Married Women’s 
Property Acts to the 1970s); Siegel, supra note 116, at 1112–88 (describing the women’s rights 
movement’s efforts to justify demands for joint property rights in marriage). 
 166 See, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981) (invalidating Louisiana community 
property law treating husbands as “head and master” of property jointly owned with wife); Orr v. 
Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 270–71 (1979) (invalidating a law requiring only men to pay alimony to their 
ex-wives); see also Maxine Eichner, Marriage and the Elephant: The Liberal Democratic State’s Regulation of 
Intimate Relationships Between Adults, HARV. J.L. & GENDER 25, 47 (2007) (recognizing that since the 
1970s marriage has lost its gender-based duties); Susan Frelich Appleton, Missing in Action? Searching 
for Gender Talk in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 97, 113 (2005) (the legal 
system eliminated different rules for women and men in areas of alimony, child custody, property 
management, and estate oversight). 
 167 Martha Albertson Fineman, Progress and Progression in Family Law, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 7 (2004) (“The 
legal relationship between husband and wife has been completely rewritten in gender–neutral, 
equality aspiring terms”); MCCLAIN, supra note 2, at 61, 76. 
 168 JACOB, supra note 116, at 5; Singer, supra note 113, at 1462–65.  
 169 Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal of California’s No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 291, 293 (1987); 
Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U. 
CINCINNATI L. REV. 1, 43–44 (1987); RHODE, supra note 164; JACOB, supra note 116, at 168 
(“[T]he feminists who might otherwise have been attracted to divorce law reform were preoccupied 
with the Equal Rights Amendment, abortion, and other issues . . . .”). 
 170 Martha L. Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change: A Study of Rhetoric 
and Results in the Regulation of the Consequences of Divorce, WIS. L. REV. 789, 811 (1983) (noting that the 
major actor in divorce reform in Wisconsin was the feminist community); Jana B. Singer, Divorce 
Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. Rev. 1103, 1105 (1989) (highlighting that the no-fault revolution 
was supported by a number of women’s rights advocates).  
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became a symbol of scrapping sex-based presumptions,171 and a liberal right 
to divorce was perceived by many women as “a splendid enhancement of 
their status both in marriage and after,”172 a social validation of the female 
right to self-actualization.173   
The gradual repudiation of coverture and the legal disabilities attending 
marriage have, of course, substantially reduced the significance of marriage 
as a limitation on women’s ability to participate as equal citizens in society.  
Yet, as the ensuing analysis will demonstrate, the dramatic legal 
transformation of marital status rules has not effected a commensurate 
transformation in the lived experience of marriage.  While gender hierarchy 
is surely not as severe or overt as it was during the nineteenth-century marital 
regime, significant status inequalities still persist between twenty-first century 
husbands and wives.  
2.  Marital Reality Today: Documenting Private Patriarchy and its Public 
Consequences 
Well into the twenty-first century, egalitarian marriage—however 
modestly defined174—still remains a “downright contradiction of terms.”175  
The majority of contemporary couples, regardless of race or class, live 
according to either the traditional marriage model, characterized by gender 
specialization that confines women’s talents to housekeeping and caretaking, 
or the modern dual-earner model, where marital life is often directed by what 
this Article calls “separate-spheres ideology in disguise.”176  Whatever the 
model of marriage, social scientists have consistently detected that “his” 
 
 171 Thomas M. Mulroy, Are Women Losing the Battle?—No-Fault Divorce, 75 A.B.A. J. 76, 76 (1989); see also 
Kay, supra note 14, at 2060 (recounting that California was the first state to consider no-fault 
divorce). 
 172 J. Herbie DiFonzo, No-Fault Marital Dissolution: The Bitter Triumph of Naked Divorce, 31 S.D. L. REV. 
519, 550 (1994); see also JACOB, supra note 116, at 3, 23 (detailing the effects that the feminist 
movement had on views of marriage). 
 173 Martha L. Fineman, Neither Silent, Nor Revolutionary, 23 L. & SOC’Y REV. 945, 947 (1989); DIFONZO, 
supra note 140, at 173; Nichols, supra note 20, at 939 (describing how women’s advocates celebrated 
no-fault divorce for freeing women to realize their full potential by extricating themselves from 
constraining marriages).  
 174 Wax, supra note 2, at 531–35. 
 175 APPLEWHITE, supra note 16, at 270. 
 176 To be sure, this is not to suggest that spouses are expected to or even should be equal in all respects. 
In practice, however, marital inequality often translates into wifely subordination.  See Frantz & 
Dagan, supra note 10, at 91 & n.61 (distinguishing marriage from other joint enterprises). 
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marriage—the husband’s—is overwhelmingly better than “hers”—the 
wife’s.177   
In what follows, this Subsection endeavors to show that the typical 
marriage is a relationship not between equal partners but between 
dominating and subordinate figures, according to three indices of marital 
power: role specialization, decision-making authority, and the use of force.  
It then examines women’s divorce accounts to demonstrate that women 
recognize the subordinating effects of marriage on their lives and the 
importance of divorce to achieving emancipation, independence, and 
dignity.   
a.  Gender-Role Differentiation at Home and in the Market  
 Approximately one in five American marriages today involves a 
breadwinner and a full-time homemaker.178  A wealth of literature has 
eminently established that dividing economic and domestic responsibilities 
on the basis of gender inevitably marginalizes women, limits their access to 
universally valued resources, and devalues their contributions to their 
families. 179   
The role of breadwinner brings status, recognition, and economic reward 
in the larger world; the role of the homemaker brings none.180  Breadwinning 
 
 177 See JESSIE BERNARD, THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE 14 (2d ed. 1982) (“There are two marriages… 
in every marital union, his and hers. And his . . . is better than hers.”); see also EILEEN MAVIS 
HETHERINGTON & JOHN KELLY, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: DIVORCE RECONSIDERED, at 
ch. 2 (2003); CATHERINE KOHLER RIESSMAN, DIVORCE TALK: WOMEN AND MEN MAKE SENSE 
OF PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 15 (1990).  
 178 JANICE M. STEIL, MARITAL EQUALITY: ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE WELL-BEING OF HUSBANDS 
AND WIVES 97 (1997); MARY FRANCES BERRY, THE POLITICS OF PARENTHOOD: CHILD CARE, 
WOMEN’S RIGHTS, AND THE MYTH OF THE GOOD MOTHER 8 (1993) (observing that one woman 
in five is a full-time homemaker); Catherine Albiston, Institutional Inequality, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1093, 
1124–25 (2009) (noting that 20% of families in 2006 fit the traditional model of a breadwinner and 
a stay-at-home parent); Gretchen Livingston, Stay-at-Home Moms and Dads Account for About One-in-
Five U.S. Parents, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2018/09/24/stay-at-home-moms-and-dads-account-for-about-one-in-five-u-s-parents/. 
 179 STEIL, supra note 178, at 45–54; see also Vivian Hamilton, Mistaking Marriage for Social Policy, 11 VA. 
J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 307, 317 (2004) (arguing that the marital family has contributed to the 
marginalization of women). 
 180 RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 56; Martha L. A. Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political Role of 
Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181, 2188 (1995) (“[T]he uncompensated tasks of caretaking are 
placed with women while men pursue careers that provide economically for the family but also 
enhance their individual career or work prospects.”). 
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husbands acquire knowledge, income, status, and prestige from their work, 
which enhances their independence, self-esteem, and social contacts.181  
Husbands’ access to such resources significantly increases their bargaining 
power within the marriage.182  Homemaking wives, by contrast, lack 
financial independence and alternative sources of achievement, self-esteem, 
and affirmation; enjoy limited opportunities to access resources and develop 
competence; and highly depend on their marriages, factors that reduce their 
influence and marital bargaining power.183   
Entrenched societal values that place a high premium on paid 
employment while devaluing unpaid housework further bolster 
breadwinning husbands and marginalize the contributions of homemaking 
wives.184  These adverse effects in turn converge in ways that make it 
“exceedingly difficult for [a wife] to interact with her spouse as an equal 
partner.”185  Indeed, social scientists of diverse orientations have found that, 
while marriage benefits men on each and every measure of well-being 
examined, for women it has often proven a source of personal unhappiness, 
psychological costs, and restricted opportunities for personal achievement 
and public participation.186  As Betty Friedan cautioned in The Feminine 
 
 181 Gregory S. Alexander, The New Marriage Contract and the Limits of Private Ordering, 73 IND. L.J. 503, 
507 (1998) (“[M]en and women share unequally the benefits and burdens of marriage” and “[m]en 
tend to have greater bargaining power and use that power advantage to satisfy their preferences at 
the expense of their wives”). 
 182 OKIN, supra note 4, at 157–59 (describing studies of power within families demonstrating that “the 
amount of money a person earns—in comparison with a partner’s income—establishes relative 
power); M. Rivka Polatnick, Why Men Don’t Rear Children: A Power Analysis, in MOTHERING: ESSAYS 
IN FEMINIST THEORY 21, 24–28 (Joyce Trebilcot ed., 1983); STEIL, supra note 178, at 47. 
 183 STEIL, supra note 178, at 47, 54.  For the many benefits of participation in the labor force, see 
Marion Crain, Feminizing Unions: Challenging the Gendered Structure of Wage Labor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 
1155, 1177 (1991). 
 184 STEIL, supra note 178, at 47. 
 185 Id. (noting the validity of this conclusion even for couples who strive to minimize materialistic 
concerns).  
 186 Systematic analyses of marriage and the family found that men tended to be more satisfied in their 
relationships than women and that women, as a group, tended to be more seriously disappointed 
in their marriages.  Researchers depict contemporary marriage as a “bad bargain” for a woman, 
affecting her life substantially more than a man’s and often causing women to experience a loss of 
control over their own lives.  See Robert L. Burgess, Relationships in Marriage and the Family, in 1 
PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS: STUDYING PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 179, 185 (Steve Duck & 
Robin Gilour eds., 1981); Anita Bernstein, For and Against Marriage: A Revision, 102 MICH. L. REV. 
129, 178–79 (2003) (discussing the substantial gender gap in gains from marriage); STEIL, supra note 
178, at 71, 103 (detailing the costs of marital inequality to women); id. at 87 (showing research 
consistently reports that wives are less satisfied in marriage than husbands and that their marriages 
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Mystique—a book credited with reawakening the women’s movement and 
sparking Second-Wave Feminism in the United States187—women’s 
specialization in the work of the home perpetuates men’s dominance and 
women’s social and economic dependence.188   
A growing majority of marriages today concededly function in a dual-
earner model,189 but considerable sociological research suggests that the 
traditional gender roles of husband and wife “continue to provide a general 
blueprint for marriage, situating men’s work primarily in the public sphere 
and women’s in the private.”190  Even the most egalitarian, professional dual-
career couples tend to “build life structures with one foot in the past, 
mimicking traditional marriages of their parents’ generation, and one foot in 
the feminist influenced present . . . .”191  Many twenty-first century marriages 
therefore continue to function as a limiting force on women’s ability to 
participate as equal citizens.192  Some feminists have gone so far as to suggest 
that married women in dual-earner marriages who work as providers in 
 
are less affirming, less validating, and less nurturing than their husbands’); HETHERINGTON & 
KELLY, supra note 177, at 23 (reporting the existence of “his” and “her” marriage and that his is 
superior to hers); FALUDI, infra note 196, at 16–17 (noting that “if there’s one pattern that 
psychological studies have established, it’s that the institution of marriage has an overwhelmingly 
salutary effect on men’s mental health” and describing the extent to which marriage may be 
hazardous to women’s health and that the two prime causes for female depression were low social 
status and marriage); id. at 37; APPLEWHITE, supra note 16, at 3, 242 (reviewing studies and 
concluding that married women are “the most depressed segment of the population”); Herma Hill 
Kay, “Making Marriage and Divorce safe for Women” Revisited, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 71, 75 (2004) 
(marriage is “a limitation on the woman who seeks to realize her own individuality rather than 
achieving identity through her husband.”).  
 187 MAREN LOCKWOOD CARDEN, THE NEW FEMINIST MOVEMENT 154–55 (1974); Kay, supra note 
14, at 2049. 
 188 BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE 336–37 (Dell Publ’g 1983) (1963). 
 189 See, e.g., Crain, supra note 183, at 1177 (noting that almost two thirds of families have two wage 
earners). 
 190 RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 51; see also MCCLAIN, supra note 2, at 75 (noting the problem that 
people accept the idea that sex equality is an appropriate public value yet may still believe that it 
does not extend to the “private” sphere of marriage); Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New 
Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227, 2245 (1994) (explaining that women’s disproportionate 
responsibility for household work influences the wage gap).  
 191 LISA R. SILBERSTEIN, DUAL-CAREER MARRIAGE: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 174 (1992).  
 192 See MCCLAIN, supra note 2, at 135 (observing that the institution of marriage continues to shape 
female identity and gender performance); J. Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C. Stern, The Winding Road 
from Form to Function: A Brief History of Contemporary Marriage, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 
1, 28–29 (2008) (discussing how gendered norms still remain “pervasive” in the twenty-first 
century); Fiss, supra note 50, at 418–19 (“[T]he dominant contemporary social understanding 
continues to assign to women the primary responsibility for the care of children . . . .”).  
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addition to homemakers exercise even greater levels of self-sacrifice than 
women in traditional marriages, obtain fewer marital benefits, and may even 
suffer from more inequality in marital bargaining.193   
To begin with, husbands’ involvement in domestic, relationship, and 
caretaking work is widely recognized as a barometer of wives’ bargaining 
power.194  As studies extensively document, women’s chronic negotiating 
weakness pushes even “modern” marriages to slip into gendered patterns, 
characterized by grossly unequal divisions of labor in the family.195  While 
married women have drastically increased their involvement in the paid 
labor force, they continue to bear a highly disproportionate responsibility for 
the work of the home, the children, and family relationships.  As one writer 
quipped somewhat hyperbolically, “the only major change” is that husbands 
“think they do more around the house.”196   
A wealth of literature about the marital division of labor has reported on 
the overwhelming domestic duties imposed on married women, amounting 
to a “double day” or “second shift” at home.197  Working wives perform 
approximately eighty percent of the housework, spending about fifteen hours 
more each week on housework than their husbands.198  Working women also 
 
 193 AUGUSTUS Y. NAPIER, THE FRAGILE BOND: IN SEARCH OF AN EQUAL, INTIMATE, AND 
ENDURING MARRIAGE 78 (1988); Wax, supra note 2, at 515. 
 194 STEIL, supra note 178, at 26, 66 (explaining that the sharing of domestic tasks is the most frequently 
cited barometer of relationship equality); Wax, supra note 2, at 603 (“[T]he wife’s decisions about 
whether or how much to work are very much a function of her bargaining power within the marital 
relationship.”). 
 195 FRANK F. FURSTENBERG, JR. & ANDREW J. CHERLIN, DIVIDED FAMILIES: WHAT HAPPENS TO 
CHILDREN WHEN PARENTS PART 29 (1991) (stating that traditional provider/caregiver roles 
continue to be a major organizing feature of household labor within contemporary marriages); 
MCCLAIN, supra note 2, at 106 (reinforcing that contemporary marriages use traditional 
provider/caregiver roles); Fineman, supra note 5, at 270 (noting that a very high proportion of 
marriages are still built upon a gender-based division of labor). 
 196 SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN xiv (1991). 
 197 ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT 
HOME 33–58 (1989); Alicia Brokars Kelly, Money Matters in Marriage: Unmasking Interdependence in 
Ongoing Spousal Economic Relations, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 113, 125–26 (2008) (summarizing 
research that “consistently” reaffirms the deeply gendered division of labor in marriage); see also 
JANET STOCKS ET AL., MODERN COUPLES SHARING MONEY, SHARING LIFE 76 (2007) (compiling 
research studies from the 2000s). 
 198 HOCHSCHILD, supra note 197, at 216–22, 259–62; Williams, supra note 190, at 2245.  Writing in 
the late 1990s, Janice Steil examined studies assessing the allocation of domestic work by both time 
and task measurement strategies, and concluded that employed women continue to do at least two 
thirds of the domestic work and that only between 2% and 12% of husbands in dual-earner families 
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perform some two-thirds of the child care, and the little that men do tend to 
be the pleasant kind of care.199  Women also disproportionately perform the 
“emotion work” crucial to maintaining family relationships, work that 
requires considerable time, effort, and skill yet generally goes 
unacknowledged.200   
To be sure, there is no evidence to support the common rejoinder that 
wives’ disproportionate time spent on domestic labor is offset by husbands’ 
disproportionate time spent on waged labor.  Sociologists report that women 
typically perform much more family work even when employed the same 
number of hours as their partners; husbands do not increase their domestic 
responsibilities when their job demands decrease; and even when 
unemployed they “do much less housework than a wife who puts in a forty-
hour week.”201  Notably, husbands whose wives outearn them are the least 
likely to share domestic responsibilities; their higher-earning wives may do 
even more housework to compensate husbands for challenging their 
masculinity and to protect their status as “primary” breadwinners.202   
 
share domestic responsibilities equally.  See STEIL, supra note 178, at 21, 55; see also HETHERINGTON 
& KELLY, supra note 177, at 249; Karst, supra note 88, at 525–26.  
 199 For example, some studies found the typical American husband spends an average of twelve to 
twenty-four minutes in solo child care each day.  See Hamilton, supra note 179, at 318 (noting that 
“shared” caretaking between parents “has remained illusory”).  Husbands still feel entitled to avoid 
domestic responsibilities; what little they do, they do not out of a sense of duty, but as “volunteers” 
who “help” their working wives in managing the household.  See RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 51.  
Accordingly, many men feel proud, not guilty, with respect to the small amount of childcare they 
do.  See Williams, supra note 190, at 2238 (“I’m spending a whole lot more time on family than my 
father did, and you’re spending far less time than your mother did.  Consequently, you feel 
incredibly guilty, while I naturally feel pretty proud of myself.”).  Indeed, numerous studies have 
repeatedly found that husbands still believe and act out as if their contributions are more valuable 
than their wives, “just because they come from men.”  Wax, supra note 2, at 582–83; id. at 589 
(noting “[m]en’s tendency to attach little importance to women’s efforts”); see also HETHERINGTON 
& KELLY, supra note 177, at 249 (comparing minimal rise in man’s contribution to household chores 
to over doubling of mothers who work in a similar period). 
 200 See STEIL, supra note 178, at 85–87. 
 201 Id. at 52; OKIN, supra note 4, at 141, 153; Jennifer R. Johnson, Preferred by Law: The Disappearance of 
the Traditional Family and Law’s Refusal to Let It Go, 25 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 125, 129 (2004) 
(“[S]tudies indicate that no matter how much money women make or how much value they place 
on their careers, they retain the majority of the caretaking responsibility.”).  For a comprehensive 
review of the literature on this point see Wax, supra note 2, at 519–24. 
 202 Monica Biernat & Camille B. Wortman, Sharing of Home Responsibilities Between Professionally Employed 
Women and Their Husbands, 60 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 844 (1991) (husbands of academic 
women who earned less than their wives were found to do less child care than husbands who earned 
more than their wives); HETHERINGTON & KELLY, supra note 177, at 250 (finding that husbands 
who earn less than wives tend to become even more reluctant to help in the work of the home); 
 
496 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 22:2 
   
 
Even among couples that aspire to egalitarian relationships, husbands are 
often at leisure while their wives are at work, either within or outside the 
home, a phenomenon sociologists term “the work-leisure gap.”203  Employed 
women work substantially longer hours than both housewives and 
husbands,204 as men “have taken full advantage of their bargaining power to 
minimize the extent to which women’s market efforts impinge on their 
freedom and leisure.”205  By these measures, “modern” working wives are 
paradoxically worse off than their “traditional” sisters.   
It is worth noting that such gender inequality tends to grow stronger and 
bolder as a marriage progresses.206  As Amy Wax has persuasively showed, 
using bargaining theory principles, the longer women are married, the more 
they experience a progressive erosion in their bargaining power, enabling 
husbands to steadily pressure women to take on even more responsibility for 
unpaid work.207   
This modern form of separate spheres in disguise for husbands and wives 
produces marital inequality and erodes women’s status in the family.  Even 
to this day, a majority of Americans still endorse the male-as-breadwinner-
and-female-as-caregiver model and ascribe different meanings to the waged 
 
Hochschild, supra note 197, at 216–22, 259–62 (husbands earning less than their wives were the 
least likely to participate in housework); STEIL, supra note 178, at 53–54, 110. 
 203 STEIL, supra note 178, at 52–53; Wax, supra note 2, at 523.  
 204 NAPIER, supra note 193, at 78 (arguing women in dual-earner marriages are worse off than their 
“traditional” counterparts, as they have to contend with even higher levels of self-denial and with 
less time for their personal needs); Wax, supra note 2, at 591–92; Tammy R. Pettinato, Transforming 
Marriage: The Transformation of Intimacy and the Democratizing Potential of Love, 9 J.L. FAM. STUD. 101, 
112 (2007) (“When paid and unpaid labor are combined, women work much longer hours for much 
less pay than men.”). 
 205 Wax, supra note 2, at 633; see also OKIN, supra note 4, at 153 (“husbands of wives with full-time jobs 
averaged about two minutes more housework per day than did husbands in housewife-maintaining 
families, hardly enough additional time to prepare a soft-boiled egg.”). 
 206 OKIN, supra note 4, at 123 (noting that the gendered division of labor in modern marriages 
exacerbates the asymmetric power relation between husband and wife over time); id. at 156 
(explaining that women as workers are disadvantaged by marriage itself, and more so the longer 
the duration of the marriage); Joan M. Krauskopf & Sharon Burgess Seiling, A Pilot Study on Marital 
Power as an Influence in Division of Pension Benefits at Divorce of Long Term Marriages, 2 J. DISP. RESOL. 
169, 178 (1996) (noting that the differing marital roles increase a husband’s power and reduce a 
wife’s power over time). 
 207 Wax, supra note 2, at 626–35 (discussing the phenomenon of the “bargaining squeeze” and 
explaining the host of forces that push the division of labor in directions that favor men and that 
decrease bargaining power to effect more spousal sharing of unpaid domestic work). 
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labor of husbands and wives.208  As Pepper Schwartz concluded, “[t]he 
linchpin of marital inequality is . . . the provider complex, a combination of 
roles that give the man the responsibility for financially supporting the 
family’s life-style and the woman all the auxiliary duties that allow the man 
to devote himself to work.”209   
This provider complex produces different expectations for husbands and 
wives as to the rewards available from marriage.  On the one hand, husbands 
feel entitled to appreciation for acting as “primary” providers, feel justified 
in putting their careers above their wives’, expect their wives’ undivided 
support and household services, and perceive the time they dedicate to their 
careers as an act of “family caring.”210  In this way, “even though, as a legal 
matter, marriage no longer entails a status relationship in which husbands 
have a duty to provide and may expect from wives services and obedience, 
the ‘provider complex’ continues to carry with it such expectations.”211  On 
the other hand, paid employment is still not considered an integral 
component of women’s normative roles as wives, and so women workers are 
frequently considered secondary wage earners in their families.212  
Sociologists call this phenomenon an “ideological discount rate,” whereby a 
woman’s earnings, no matter how high its proportion to family income, is 
regarded as secondary.213  Indeed, this phenomenon is rampant among 
 
 208 Kelly, supra note 197, at 130–31, 135 (explaining that the male-as-breadwinner-and-female-as-
caretaker model is still influential today and breadwinning is still part of the construct of 
masculinity); Nancy E. Shurtz, Gender Equity and Tax Policy: The Theory of “Taxing Men”, 6 S. CAL. 
REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 485, 531 (1997) (noting that surveys show a widespread belief in the 
male “breadwinner” role); MCCLAIN, supra note 2, at 137–38 (pointing to contemporary research 
about gender roles within marriage).  
 209 PEPPER SCHWARTZ, PEER MARRIAGE: HOW LOVE BETWEEN EQUALS REALLY WORKS 111–13 
(1994). 
 210 MCCLAIN, supra note 2, at 72, 137 (summarizing that the association of men with the breadwinning 
role often fosters inequality by yielding husbands more power and respect in marriage); OKIN, supra 
note 4, at 14, 95. 
 211 MCCLAIN, supra note 2, at 137. 
 212 See generally Allen M. Parkman, Bargaining Over Housework: The Frustrating Situation of Secondary Wage 
Earners, 63 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 765 (2004) (observing that women tend to work less in the home 
as their earnings increase outside the home); see also Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey, Contemporary Approaches 
to Compensating Female Tort Victims for Incapacity to Work, 38 ALBERTA L. REV. 504, 509 (2000) 
(recognizing that the lost earnings method of evaluating plaintiffs’ losses creates a gendered 
problem); Philomila Tsoukala, Gary Becker, Legal Feminism, and the Costs of Moralizing Care, 16 COLUM. 
J. GENDER & L. 357, 382 (2007) (citing sociological studies finding that most women are still 
considered secondary wage earners and also take on the bulk of the child-rearing duties). 
 213 Kelly, supra note 197, at 130–31. 
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working class families where wives often provide at least half of total 
income,214 and even in families where wives earn more than husbands.215  
Viewed neither as primary providers, nor even as co-providers, working 
wives are consistently excluded from the benefits associated with this 
status.216  
This leads to the devaluation of women’s work both at home and in the 
labor market.217  Moreover, women’s “second-shift” or “double day” at 
home has serious public repercussions for gender equality and women’s place 
in society.  Numerous married women have little choice but to work in lower-
status, low-waged, or part-time jobs, forgo advancement opportunities, and 
generally place a lower priority on their own careers for the sake of their 
husbands.218  In fact, one third of married women with children are out of 
the labor force; among married women who are employed, a third work only 
 
 214 See, e.g., Martin H. Malin, Unemployment Compensation in a Time of Increasing Work-Family Conflicts, 29 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 131, 133–34 (1996) (stating that fifty-five percent of employed women and 
forty-eight percent of married employed women provide at least half of their families’ income); see 
also FAMILIES AND WORK INST., WOMEN: THE NEW PROVIDERS 33 (1995) (evidencing the same 
trend).  
 215 STEIL, supra note 178, at 66 (finding that of all the wives who out-earn husbands, the careers of 
none were considered primary).  
 216 See Adjin-Tettey, supra note 212, at 509 (stating that the perception of women’s income as secondary 
leads to devaluation of women’s work inside and outside of the home); see also Marion Crain & Ken 
Matheny, “Labor’s Divided Ranks”: Privilege and the United Front Ideology, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1542, 
1587–88 (1999) (discussing the problems women encounter because they are perceived as 
“secondary” wage earners). 
 217 See STEIL, supra note 178, at 49 (“For women, separate gender roles preclude the view of a wife as 
either primary provider or co-provider.”); Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey, Replicating and Perpetuating 
Inequalities in Personal Injury Claims Through Female-Specific Contingencies, 49 MCGILL L.J. 309, 328 (2004) 
(arguing that rigid gender roles lead to the assertion that there is “no need for women to engage in 
paid employment”).  Rather, most two-earner couples today find both incomes necessary to sustain 
their standard of living.  See, e.g., Crain, supra note 183, at 1176 (“The idea that most women are 
secondary wage earners whose earnings are ‘pin money’ in the family economic situation is patently 
false.”). 
 218 See JUDY GOLDBERG DEY & CATHERINE HILL, BEHIND THE PAY GAP 2 (2007) (“Mothers are more 
likely than fathers (or other women) to work part time, take leave, or take a break from the work 
force”); MILTON C. REGAN, FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 155 (1993) (stating 
that “women are more likely than men to make career sacrifices in order to meet family 
responsibilities, and therefore often are economically dependent on men”); Naomi Cahn, The Power 
of Caretaking, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 177, 185–86 (2000) (stating that women are much more 
likely than men are to interrupt their work to care for children); Singer, supra note 170, at 1115 
(same); Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, Autonomy, and Self 
Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 13, 19–20 (2000) (highlighting the economic and 
career costs of acting as a caretaker).  
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part-time and many who work full-time are on the “mommy track.”219  
Having been forced to make marriage-specific investments at the expense of 
labor market investments,220 married women often become “wedlocked 
wives,”221 limited in their professional capacities and deprived of 
opportunities to participate in politics, influence social choices, and become 
financially self-supporting.222  The result is wives pushed deep into the private 
sphere and marginalized in the public sphere, a serious male-female wage 
differential, and the strengthening of sex segregation in the economy.223  
 
 219 Williams, supra note 190, at 2237. 
 220 On this point, it is worth noting several important differences in the gender cultures of higher versus 
lower socioeconomic status couples, though both result in the perpetuation of traditional gender 
roles and the economic marginalization of women.  In higher status families, driven by society’s 
preference for male career success and an occupational culture where the “ideal worker” is assumed 
to have no significant familial responsibilities, women who are themselves trained for professional 
careers often have to marginalize their own labor market participation by performing domestic 
services to promote their husbands’ occupational success.  MCCLAIN, supra note 2, at 107; Vicki 
Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1892 (2000); Williams, supra note 190, at 2239–40.  
Alternatively, high-status wives shift the burden of gender inequality to other low-class women, to 
whom they assign the domestic responsibilities their husbands “delegate” to them, a solution that 
has turned “a gender problem into a class problem and has been a source of considerable hostility 
to feminism.” Williams, supra note 190, at 2237 n.40; see also Fineman, supra note 180, at 2209.  
Meanwhile, in lower status families, where men often work in low prestige jobs that erode their 
dignity and threaten their masculinity, husbands tend to adhere especially strictly to traditional sex 
roles and to renounce domestic responsibilities at home.  Williams, supra note 190, at 2242–43.  
This dynamic, in turn, pressures wives to select low-status, low-paid occupations to enhance their 
husbands’ sense of self-worth.  See OKIN, supra note 4, at 153; Williams, supra note 190, at 2244–45. 
 221 RHODE, supra note 164, at 133. 
 222 See, e.g., OKIN, supra note 4, at 123 (stating that most wives are constrained in their opportunities in 
the labor force by what is required of them at home); Kelly, supra note 197, at 126 (detailing the 
various sacrifices women make in the labor force to support husbands’ market participation, which 
significantly erode their power in both the market and home, while enhancing their husbands’); 
Wax, supra note 2, at 546 (stating that women’s labor market value tends to be impaired by 
marriage); Williams, supra note 190, at 2245 (finding that while marriage enhances men’s market 
potential, it erodes women’s). 
 223 Williams, supra note 190, at 2245.  See generally Jane Friesen, Alternative Economic Perspectives on the Use 
of Labor Market Policies to Redress the Gender Gap in Compensation, 82 GEO. L.J. 31, 39 (1993) (“When the 
gender wage gap is decomposed in the usual way, the differential effects of marital status account 
for about one-third of the unexplained portion of the mean differential between men’s and women’s 
earnings.”). 
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b.  Decisionmaking Power  
While women’s disproportionate investment in the work of the home is a 
“major indicator” of marital inequality,224 it is not the sole measure.  
Decisionmaking power is another important factor, which usually correlates 
with earnings and job prestige.  Consequently, status disparities between 
husbands and wives in society at large significantly influence negotiation 
dynamics within marriages.  As a result, the diminished agency of women 
within the average marriage is pervasive among decision-making roles within 
the home.225  Men almost universally enjoy greater bargaining power in the 
marriage, rendering women unequal, lower status partners.226 
Studies indicate that employed husbands consistently enjoy the greatest 
say in all aspects of their marriages, homemakers have the least, and even 
employed wives seldom have as much say as their husbands.227  When 
married women become mothers, they tend to suffer an additional decline in 
influence.228  
Even where wives earn substantially more than their husbands, however, 
husbands still tend to enjoy greater say in financial matters.229  As researchers 
 
 224 STEIL, supra note 178, at 54, 66. 
 225 Id.  
 226 Sociological studies since the 1960s have documented that “power within the family generally tracks 
power outside it.”  See Joan Williams, Toward a Reconstructive Feminism: Reconstructing the Relationship of 
Market Work and Family Work, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 89, 154 (1998) (arguing that gender norms in 
parenting link caregiving roles with disempowerment in the family); see also Marsha Garrison, 
Autonomy or Community?  An Evaluation of Two Models of Parental Obligation, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 41, 107 
(1998) (stating that “the typical American husband continues to have more power within marriage 
than his wife”); Kelly, supra note 197, at 135 (stating that sex-differentiated roles that persist in 
marriage erode women’s power in the market and at home, while allowing men greater earning 
power that can translate into more muscle in intra-family money matters); Wax, supra note 2, at 
513 (recounting that husbands on average have more power and are in a position to “get their way” 
more often). 
 227 STEIL, supra note 178, at 29–30; June Carbone, Has the Gender Divide Become Unbridgeable?  The 
Implications for Social Equality, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 31, 79–80 (2001) (“Studies show that the 
level of equality in marriage reflects the parties’ relative earning capacity.”); Janice M. Steil & Beth 
A. Turetsky, Is Equal Better?  The Relationship Between Marital Equality and Psychological Symptomatology, 7 
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. ANN. 73 (1987); Williams, supra note 190, at 2288 (stating that feminist 
work establishes that men’s greater power in the market results in greater power within the family).  
 228 STEIL, supra note 178, at 16, 18, 22, 28–29 (noting that family size is associated with marital power; 
mothers have the least equal relationships, whereas wives with no or few children have more 
influence). 
 229  Studies have indicated that husbands tended to have the final say in major decisions, that wives 
tended to characterize their husbands as “the real boss in the family,” and that unemployed wives 
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have been forced to conclude, the persistence of the provider complex, which 
conceptualizes men as primary breadwinners, still works to maintain male 
domination within modern marriages,230 and so women’s economic gains in 
the workplace have not translated into commensurate gains at home, even 
though earning power normally increases bargaining power.231  
c.  Domestic Abuse 
Another gauge of marital inequality is physical disempowerment: the use 
of force by a spouse to establish authority over the other.  Domestic violence 
and sexual abuse are the ultimate acts of inequality in marriage, both a 
symptom and a cause of spousal subordination.232  There is dramatic gender 
asymmetry in the incidence of violence between husbands and wives—the 
vast majority of victims are women.233  Estimates suggest that over one third 
 
were more likely to report husbandly dominance in decision making than employed wives.  See id. 
at 55–57 (summarizing numerous studies assessing marital power measured by decision-making 
say).  See also DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 16, at 3 (reviewing the state of contemporary marriage 
and concluding that, while some aspects of marriage have dramatically changed, others—especially 
traditional gender norms—have stubbornly resisted alteration, and that “[m]ost importantly, men 
tend to retain their financial hegemony, both over women in general and over wives in particular.”). 
230 See, e.g., OKIN, supra note 4, at 95, 141 (arguing that the economic dependence of women on men 
and the emphasis society places on economic success reinforces power imbalances in marital 
relationships); RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 73 (“The provider role translates into diffuse power 
within the family and creates inequality between husbands and wives.”); STEIL, supra note 178, at 
84–85; Kelly, supra note 197, at 127 (noting that the reason women may enjoy less power at home 
is not necessarily the result of less market power, but “a reflection of gender ideologies embedded 
in society and manifested in marriage”); id. at 128 (“One obvious explanation for uneven 
distribution of work and power for some couples is the continued subordination of women.”). 
 231 OKIN, supra note 4, at 159 (noting that the male-provider ideology sometimes overwhelms women’s 
workplace successes in influencing the distribution of power in marriage); STEIL, supra note 178, at 
49; Wax, supra note 2, at 593. 
 232 Wife-beating in the family setting builds on traditional assumptions about gender roles and in turn 
reflects and reinforces other patterns of gender inequality.  See RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 62 
(arguing that domestic violence follows other forms of domination because primarily husbands are 
the perpetrators and wives are the victims); Eppler, supra note 120, at 790–91 n.14 (“Feminist 
scholars have persuasively argued that woman battering is . . . a graphic and explicit demonstration 
of men’s domination over women.”); Kenneth Karst, Sources of Status-Harm and Group Disadvantage in 
Private Behavior, 2 ISSUES LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 13 (2002) (emphasis in original) (“Within the private 
zone of the intimate relationship, however, power is being exercised when a man beats his wife.”). 
 233 See MCCLAIN, supra note 2, at 132 (stating that, according to a survey of Oklahomans, forty-four 
percent of women as opposed to eight percent of men identify domestic violence as a factor leading 
to their divorce); Ariella Hyman, Dean Schillinger & Bernard Lo, Laws Mandating Reporting of 
Domestic Violence: Do They Promote Patient Well-being?, 273 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1781, 1781 (1995) 
(reporting findings that ninety to ninety-five percent of domestic violence victims are women).  For 
a review of domestic violence acts, which indicate the grossly disproportionate risk of violence for 
 
502 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 22:2 
   
 
of married women have experienced some form of physical abuse234 and 
“[a]s many as one in seven women have been raped by their husbands.”235  
Of the women who eventually divorce, more than two-thirds leave behind 
violent husbands.236   
The psychological and sociological literatures explain wife battering as a 
way of displaying power in a marriage, a tool to “effect total domination of a 
woman by a man,”237 to accomplish goals, and to guarantee female 
submissiveness.238  In fact, scholars have urged that the gender-neutral term 
“domestic violence” be replaced with “patriarchal violence” because the 
phenomenon is inherently connected to “sexism, to sexist thinking, and to 
male dominance.”239  The research on marital rape also confirms that it is 
used as a symbol of a husband’s control over his wife240 and is “only 
 
women, see Molly Dragiewicz & Yvonne Lindgren, The Gendered Nature of Domestic Violence: Statistical 
Data for Lawyers Considering Equal Protection Analysis, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 229, 245–
56 (2009) (asserting that women face a grossly disproportionate risk of violence from male partners). 
 234 See Martha R. Mahoney, Exit: Power and the Idea of Leaving in Love, Work, and the Confirmation Hearings, 
65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1283, 1288 n.16 (1992) (“The rate of physical abuse in marriage has been 
estimated by Lenore Walker and other experts at about 50%, though the lowest recent estimate is 
12% and the highest is 60%.”); Statistics, NAT’L COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 
https://ncadv.org/statistics (last visited Feb. 7, 2020).   
 235 See KATHA POLLITT, REASONABLE CREATURES: ESSAYS ON WOMEN AND FEMINISM 6 (1994).  
Battering often includes violent sexual assaults.  See DAVID FINKELHOR & KERSTI YLLO, LICENSE 
TO RAPE: SEXUAL ABUSE OF WIVES 6–7 (1985); DIANA RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE 87–101 
(1990); McConnell, supra note 111, at 230 n.128 (“[O]ne out of ten wives has been sexually assaulted 
at least once by her husband.”); see also RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 82 (stating that sexual abuse 
of women in marriage is “[f]ar from a rare event” because wives are considered the “sexual property 
of husbands.”).  
 236 DEMIE KURZ, FOR RICHER FOR POORER: MOTHERS CONFRONT DIVORCE 53, 56, 59 (1995);  
Nichols, supra note 20, at 943. 
 237 McConnell, supra note 111, at 233. 
 238 Eppler, supra note 120, at 791 n.14 (stating that domestic violence is a “violent manifestation of the 
patriarchal beliefs that men have the right to dominate, control, and rule over women . . . [as] the 
‘property’ or ‘possession’ of men.”); see also Mahoney, supra note 234, at 1304 (“Separation assault 
. . . shows that batterers do not stop seeking power and control merely because the woman has left 
the relationship.”); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 
90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 53 (1991) (“Battering is about domination. . . .”). 
 239 See Anat First & Michal Agmon-Gonnen, Is a Man’s Car More Important Than a Battered Woman’s Body?  
Human Rights and Punishment for Violent Crimes Against Female Spouses, 12 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 135, 138 
(2009).  
 240 See ELIZABETH A. STANKO, INTIMATE INTRUSIONS: WOMEN’S EXPERIENCE OF MEN’S 
VIOLENCE 9 (1985); McConnell, supra note 111, at 231–32 (arguing that sexual assault in a 
relationship is symbolic of the man’s domination of the woman); Angie Perone, Unchain My Heart: 
Slavery as a Defense to the Dismantling of the Violence Against Women Act, 17 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 115, 
135–36 (2006) (marital rape is a common method of exerting domination over an abused wife); 
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peripherally about sex.”241  Moreover, some scholars view wife rape and 
battering as a bias crime motivated by a desire “to punish the victim in order 
to further subordinate the victim’s group based on negative views of 
them.”242  The cumulative effect of the persistent threat of male violence is 
to subordinate not only an individual wife, but all women.243 
Strikingly, study after study exposes wife battering as a means to enforce 
women’s traditional roles and other patterns of gender inequality.244  Indeed, 
the typical batterer has been revealed to be “a traditionalist, believing in male 
supremacy, the stereotyped masculine sex role in the family, and his 
entitlement to use violence to discipline his wife.”245   Husbands who batter 
rationalize their violence towards their wives by stressing women’s traditional 
roles,246 and tend to focus on their victims’ “failure to fulfill obligations of a 
good wife”247 with complaints that range from the deficient performance of 
 
Kathleen Waits, Battered Women and Their Children: Lessons From One Woman’s Story, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 
29, 40 (1998) (describing one domestic violence victim’s experience of sexual assault as her 
husband’s way of punishing her). 
 241 FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 235, at 18.  But see CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM 
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW  86–87 (1987).  
 242 Kristin L. Taylor, Treating Male Violence Against Women as a Bias Crime, 76 B.U. L. REV. 575, 595 
(1996). 
 243 Id. at 586, 596–97; Tania Tetlow, Discriminatory Acquittal, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 75, 90, 95 
(2009) (arguing that private violence enforces gender inequities); Beverly Balos, Domestic Violence 
Matters: The Case for Appointed Counsel in Protective Order Proceedings, 15 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 557, 
574 (2006) (noting that even though violence is targeted at an individual wife, “it also has the effect 
of enforcing gender roles . . . [and] gender hierarchy.”); see also Dragiewicz & Lindgren, supra note 
233, at 263–66 (reviewing how courts, the legislatures, and Congress have all identified domestic 
violence as gender discrimination). 
 244 Domestic and sexual violence is rooted in and reflects the legacy of sex discrimination.  See, e.g., 
ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 13–20 (2000) 
(analyzing historical perspectives of domestic and sexual violence); Linda L. Ammons, What’s God 
Got to Do With It?  Church and State Collaboration in the Subordination of Women and Domestic Violence, 51 
RUTGERS L. REV. 1207, 1219 (1999) (noting the strong link between male supremacy and battered 
wives); Catherine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1301 
(1991) (“Women are sexually assaulted because they are women: not individually or at random, but 
on the basis of sex, because of their membership in a group defined by gender.”). 
 245 Malinda L. Seymore, Isn’t it a Crime: Feminist Perspectives on Spousal Immunity and Spousal Violence, 90 
NW. U.L. REV. 1032, 1039–41 (1996) (profiling the batterer husband).  See also Taylor, supra note 
242, at 595 (“Many clinical studies suggest that men who use violence against their intimate 
partners idealize a rigid patriarchal family unit and have restricted and stereotypical views of their 
masculine role.”).  
 246 Mahoney, supra note 234, at 1304; Mahoney, supra note 238, at 54–55. 
 247 James Ptacek, Why Do Men Batter Their Wives, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE 133, 147 
(Raquel Kennedy Bergen ed., 1998) (quoting MICHELE BOGRAD, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: 
PERCEPTIONS OF BATTERED WOMEN, ABUSIVE MEN, AND NON-VIOLENT MEN AND WOMEN 
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domestic tasks to refusing sex.248  In other words, non-compliance with 
gender roles offends batterers’ sense of male entitlement so severely as to 
legitimize the abuse as a disciplinary measure to put women in their place249 
and signal that male prerogatives have been wrongfully revoked. 250 
Wife battering has indeed proven so effective in coercing domestic and 
sexual services through degradation and subjection that many scholars have 
proffered that violent marriages effect not simply gender subordination, but 
even involuntary servitude implicating the Thirteenth Amendment.251    
* * * 
We have observed that contemporary marriages are still rife with gender 
injustice and inequalities that demean women and compromise their 
citizenship stature.  Wives are saddled with the vast majority of unpaid, low-
status domestic and caretaking work, tend to defer to their husbands when 
major decisions must be made, and all too often are subject to husbands who 
use violence to establish and enforce their dominance.  As a result, women 
as a group are still systematically below men along important dimensions of 
social welfare, especially income, wealth, and political power;252 these group-
based disparities forcefully bear on the question of second-class citizenship.  
Put differently, the marital inequality that still plagues contemporary 
 
(1986)) (emphasis removed); ELIJAH ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET: DECENCY, VIOLENCE, 
AND THE MORAL LIFE OF THE INNER CITY 189 (1999) (“When men do get married and are unable 
to establish domestic control, physical abuse sometimes follows.”); MCCLAIN, supra note 2, at 139; 
RHODE, supra note 164, at 238; Katharine K. Baker, Dialectics and Domestic Abuse, 110 YALE L.J. 
1459, 1487 (2001) (reviewing ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST 
LAWMAKING (2000)). 
 248 LEWIS OKUN, WOMAN ABUSE: FACTS REPLACING MYTHS 69–70 (1986); Rhonda Copelon, 
Recognizing the Egregious in Everyday Life: Domestic Violence as Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
291, 335–36 (1994); PAUL KIVEL, MEN’S WORK: HOW TO STOP THE VIOLENCE THAT TEARS 
OUR LIVES APART 200 (1992); Lisa E. Martin, Providing Equal Justice for the Domestic Violence Victim: 
Due Process and the Victim’s Right to Counsel, 34 GONZ. L. REV. 329, 332 (1999) (noting that in a typical 
case, a battered woman is beaten because her housekeeping skills did not meet her abuser’s 
expectations). 
 249 ANDERSON, supra note 247, at 183, 189; MCCLAIN, supra note 2, at 139; RHODE, supra note 164, at 
238; Baker, supra note 247, at 1487. 
 250 Seymore, supra note 245, at 1039. 
 251 After all, as Akhil Reed Amar put it, “[a]t its core, slavery is a system of domination, degradation 
and subordination, in which some people are allowed in effect to treat other persons—other human 
beings with God-given rights—as property rather than persons.”  Akhil Reed Amar, Remember the 
Thirteenth, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 403, 405 (1993); see also id. at 408 (analyzing domestic abuse 
through a Thirteenth Amendment lens); Perone, supra note 240, at 133, 136 (same); McConnell, 
supra note 111, at 233, 239–43 (same).  
 252 Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2448–49 (1994). 
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marriages implicates not only women’s private family lives, but also their 
prospects for enjoying equal citizenship stature in society. 
 Our analysis thus far has derived from a close reading of marriage as it 
is and has been lived by women.  The next Section looks at the lived 
experience of marital freedom by examining women’s divorce accounts.  As 
it will show, from the standpoint of women themselves, inequality in 
marriage is often so pervasive and so costly to well-being that it functions as 
a major motivating force behind their decision to divorce.  Moreover, as they 
testify, divorce for many women has indeed constituted a valuable means for 
tackling experiences with marital subordination and “dual sovereignty.”   
C.  Divorce: A “Self-Defense” Remedy to Marital Subordination  
This Section aims to demonstrate how divorce can ameliorate gender 
stratification and the subordination of women.  First, it identifies marital 
inequality as a primary cause of female-initiated divorce.  Second, it analyzes 
evidence suggesting that divorce is a promising anti-subordinationist remedy 
against dual sovereignty and as a pathway towards dignity, self-esteem, 
independence, and ultimately full membership in society. 
1.  Female Divorce Accounts: Stories of Subordination, Degradation, and 
Devaluation  
With apologies to Leo Tolstoy,253 the divorce literature shows that 
Vladimir Nabokov had it right: “All happy families are more or less 
dissimilar; all unhappy ones are more or less alike.”254  Divorcing families in 
the contemporary United States resemble one another in their failure to 
constitute relationships among equal partners.255  Women of all backgrounds 
and across lines of race and class define good marriage as a partnership of 
equals,256 yet divorce memoirs reveal the abysmal failure to attain gender 
 
 253 LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 1 (George Gibian ed., Maude trans., 1995) (“All happy families 
resemble one another, but each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.”). 
 254 VLADIMIR NABOKOV, ADA OR ARDOR: A FAMILY CHRONICLE 3 (1969).  
 255 Steven L. Nock, Time and Gender in Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1971, 1979 (2000).  
 256 As Kathryn Edin testified before Congress, women seek self-government in marriage and an equal 
partnership, not subservience:  
[Men] think that piece of paper says they own you.  You are their personal slave.  Cook 
their meals, clear their house, do their laundry. . . .  A man gets married to have somebody 
take care of them . . . . 
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equality in modern marriages.  As this Subsection will show, it is women’s 
sense of subordination and devaluation in marriage and their growing 
distaste for marital inequality that has been the primary impetus for a 
phenomenon this Article terms the “feminization of divorce.”  That is, 
women initiate two-thirds to three-quarters of divorces in the United 
States,257 whether the divorce initiation is defined in terms of “who wanted 
to leave the marriage first” or “who actually filed for divorce.”258  This 
national trend is only increasing over time,259 turning marital inequality into 
“the most potent and ominous threat” to the integrity of the institution of 
modern marriage.260   
One of the first to study divorce from the perspective of divorce 
“veterans” themselves, Catharine Riessman has investigated the interpretive 
process through which divorcees make sense of their former marriages.  She 
found that “[d]ivorcing women remember marriage as anything but 
 
Most mothers don’t want to be owned or slave for their husband.  They want a 
partnership of equals.  
  Welfare and Marriage Issues: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Human Res. of the Comm. on Ways and 
Means, 107th Cong. 76–82 (2001) (testimony of Kathryn Edin, Assoc. Professor of Soc., Inst. of 
Pol’y Res., Nw. Univ.) (internal quotations omitted).  
 257 Researchers have consistently found that wives have almost always sought divorce in greater 
numbers than their husbands.  Starting in the eighteenth century, women divorce seekers 
outnumbered men.  See RILEY, supra note 142, at 16, 147.  By the end of the nineteenth century, 
the percentage of divorces awarded to wives rose to two-thirds.  See RODERICK PHILLIPS, PUTTING 
ASUNDER: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN WESTERN SOCIETY 228 (1988); Margaret F. Brinig & 
Douglas W. Allen, “These Boots are Made for Walking”: Why Most Divorce Filers are Women, 2 AM. L. & 
ECON. REV. 126, 126–28, 154 (2000). 
 258 ALISON CLARKE-STEWART & CORNELIA BRENTANO, DIVORCE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 
53–54 (2006); Sanford L. Braver, Marnie Whitely & Christine Ng, Who Divorced Whom?  
Methodological and Theoretical Issues, 20 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 1 (1993).  
 259 Cahn, supra note 126, at 233; see also Michael J. Rosenfeld, Who Wants the Breakup? Gender and Breakup 
in Heterosexual Couples, in SOCIAL NETWORKS AND THE LIFE COURSE: INTEGRATING THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN LIVES AND SOCIAL RELATIONAL NETWORKS 221 (Duane F. Alwin, 
Diane Helen Felmlee & Derek A. Kreager eds., 2017).  Remarkably, the feminization of divorce 
has been a phenomenon shared virtually everywhere in the Western world.  PHILLIPS, supra note 
257, at 228; Andrew Adonis, Britain in Focus: Wives Bring Most Divorces, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1996, 
at 10 (“Many more divorces are granted to the wife than to the husband, and this is particularly so 
where the couple have children.”).  This is, for example, the case in England and Australia.  See 
DAVIS & MURCH, supra note 130, at 32–34.  This is also the case in Israel.  See Karin Carmit Yefet, 
Unchaining the Agunot: Enlisting the Israeli Constitution in the Service of Women's Marital Freedom, 20 Yale J.L. 
& Fem. 441, 451(2009); see also Patricia L. Sullivan, Culture, Divorce, and Family Mediation in Hong Kong, 
43 FAM. CT. REV. 109, 116 (2005) (demonstrating that most divorces in China are initiated by 
women). 
 260 Wax, supra note 2, at 672. 
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equal”261 and “vividly describe in their accounts how they are financially, 
psychologically, and physically dominated by their husbands.”262  While 
individual women, of course, experience substantial differences in the 
amount and forms of inequality in their marriages, most of the divorced 
women in Riessman’s, and in later studies, explain their decision to divorce 
through these experiences, intimating that gender equality and marital 
dignity are a prerequisite for a viable marriage.263  
Among the most common forms of subordination that divorced women 
cite as triggers of marital breakdown are instances in which they are devalued 
and discredited for their work in and outside the home as well as for their 
cognitive abilities.264  Divorce accounts confirm that women’s employment, 
in particular, is a major source of friction in many marriages.265  While work 
is the strongest predictor of women’s good health and the basis for their 
identity and mobility in the world at large,266 far more than marriage or 
children,267 it also causes many husbands psychological distress, lower self-
esteem, and depression.  Even men who espouse egalitarian beliefs about 
women’s roles often perceive their wives’ employment as “against their 
 
 261 RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 57 (summarizing divorced women’s accounts of their marriages under 
the heading “Inequality: Women’s Memories of Devaluation and Subordination.”). 
 262 Id. at 73.  
 263 Starting in the 1970s, many books analyzing divorce have explained that without equality and 
mutual commitment, marriages are doomed to become a “divorce statistic.”  See the many sources 
cited by RILEY, supra note 142, at 177; Steven Ozment, Marriage Was Having a Rough Time, in 
MARRIAGE: JUST A PIECE OF PAPER? 229 (Katherine Anderson, Don Browning & Brian Boyer 
eds., 2002); ANDREW HACKER, MISMATCH: THE GROWING GULF BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN 
7 (2003). 
 264 RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 59. 
 265 Id. at 51; NAPIER, supra note 193, at 132–33 (explaining that women’s economic power often leads 
to conflict within marriage and many researchers explain the increase in divorce in recent decades 
as directly related to women’s employment).  
 266 The role of paid worker has proven extremely beneficial to women’s well-being across both race 
and class lines; it is a source of: psychological and social support; independent identity; increased 
self-esteem; purposefulness; enhanced social contacts and inherent interests; and a sense of well-
being because of their financial contribution to the family welfare.  See, e.g., STEIL, supra note 178, 
at 17–20 (providing a review of the research literature); Rosalind C. Barnett & Grace K. Baruch, 
Women’s Involvement in Multiple Roles and Psychological Distress, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
135, 136–37 (1985) (arguing that among employed women, overload and conflict “may be less 
strongly associated and conflict may be less strongly associated with psychological symptomatology 
than among nonemployed women”). 
 267 APPLEWHITE, supra note 16, at 110; FALUDI, supra note 196, at 39 (recounting that as early as the 
1950s, two-thirds of married women noted that what gave them a sense of purpose and self-worth 
was their jobs; by the 1980s, the number had risen to 87%). 
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interests” because it directs wives’ focus away from their husbands, lessens 
men’s control in marriage, and puts pressure on them to do more household 
work.268  Accordingly, many women’s divorce accounts recount husbands’ 
attempts to usurp women’s place in the public sphere by withholding support 
from their careers—or their plans to enter the labor market or return to 
school—or by demanding that they resign or cut back their hours.269  Forced 
to choose between their job and their marriage, many women chose 
divorce.270 
 The unequal division of labor is another theme that figures prominently 
in women’s accounts of marital dissatisfaction and dissolution.271  Even many 
divorced men, reflecting upon their dissolved marriages, regret having taken 
their wives’ labor for granted272 and their own shirking of household 
responsibilities.273  Divorced women also attested to more flagrant 
manifestations of marital inequality, recalling efforts at economic and 
psychological domination by their husbands.274  Many complained about 
 
 268 See RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 54–55 (documenting the same in the 1980s); LILLIAN B. RUBIN, 
WORLDS OF PAIN: LIFE IN THE WORKING-CLASS FAMILY 171–84 (1976) (documenting this 
phenomenon in the 1970s); STEIL, supra note 178, at 20 (documenting the same in the 1990s). 
 269 Divorce researchers find that since women’s participation in the workforce has increased, a new 
cause of divorce has been lack of husbandly support for women’s careers.  See CLARKE-STEWART 
& BRENTANO, supra note 258, at 44–45 (“Women also complained specifically about their 
husbands’ lack of support for their careers—a new reason for divorce that has appeared since 
women became more involved in the workforce.”); RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 53–56 (analyzing 
husbands’ lack of enthusiasm for wives’ employment). 
 270 Many women, however, make a different choice.  “Over and over, women from working-class 
marriages report that their husbands ‘said no’” and some wives “went along with husbands’ 
directives in order to keep peace at home.”  RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 60.  Indeed, research 
evidence suggests that despite women’s conviction that they are entitled to marital equality in the 
home, they are also generally hesitant to press their desire for egalitarian marriage because they 
want to avoid conflict.  MCCLAIN, supra note 2, at 145. 
 271 CLARKE-STEWART & BRENTANO, supra note 258, at 45; DONNA L. FRANKLIN, WHAT’S LOVE 
GOT TO DO WITH IT?  UNDERSTANDING AND HEALING THE RIFT BETWEEN BLACK MEN AND 
WOMEN 210 (2000) (studying twenty-first century black families where both spouses work and 
reporting that “the issue of male dominance remains one of the primary sources of tension in black 
marriages”); HETHERINGTON & KELLY, supra note 177, at 249–50; RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 
97; Michelle L. Frisco & Kristi Williams, Perceived Housework Equity, Marital Happiness, and Divorce in 
Dual-Earner Households, 24 J. FAM. ISSUES 51, 69–71 (2003) (analyzing the relationship between 
perceived equity in relationships and marital happiness). 
 272 RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 56. 
 273 Id. at 55. 
 274 Id. at 59–60 (noting that “living in tyranny” was an experience common to both low- and middle-
class women, though its manifestations tended to be somewhat subtler for the latter); FALUDI, supra 
note 196, at xvi (noting that many wives complained of “male mistreatment, unequal relationship, 
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their economic subordination within marriage and dependency on 
husbands, which reduced their voice and limited their bargaining power in 
the home.275  Ex-wives recalled their husbands’ control over finances and 
attempts to exert power over the full array of domestic decisions.276  As 
women perceived it, “husbands both demean[ed] their domesticity and 
tr[ied] to dominate it, often at the same time.”277  In making sense of their 
own divorces, some men corroborated female stories of control and admitted 
to having acted as “much of a demagogue,” a “dictator,” or “order[ing] her 
around like a little Hitler.”278 
Finally, physical and sexual violence continually reappear in women’s 
divorce accounts as the most severe expression of their husbands’ control.279  
During the marriage, abusive husbands would reiterate “their need to 
control or dominate the female, their belief that female independence meant 
loss of male control, and their attempt to persuade or coerce the female into 
adopting their definition of how the relationship should be structured and 
how it should function.”280  These husbands used violence to punish women 
 
and male efforts to… ‘keep women down.’”); Fineman, supra note 5, at 248 (“There were real 
injustices within the hierarchical and patriarchal family, exemplified by the economic inequities 
that emerged with divorce reform and the prevalence of physical and psychological abuse of 
women.”). 
 275 RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 61 (observing that in making themselves economically beholden to 
their husbands, women become subordinate to them); OKIN, supra note 4, at 151–52 (analyzing the 
effects of wives’ economic dependence on their husbands). 
 276 For example, husbands controlled decisions ranging “from the kind of food that would be served 
and which purchases would be made, to how wives used their time, to what religion they would 
practice.”  RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 59; see also Finola O. Riagain, Reasons for Martial Instability 
and Separation, in DIVORCE? FACING THE ISSUES OF MARITAL BREAKDOWN 25, 32 (Mags O’Brien 
ed., 1995) (reporting “many cases in which the pattern of money management within marriage 
gives rise to serious inequalities and even hardship, especially for women”). 
 277 RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 59. 
 278 Id. 
 279 Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 
44 VAND. L. REV. 1041, 1043 n.6 (1991) (reporting that 95% of divorcing women alleged cruelty, 
usually in the form of ongoing physical abuse, under fault divorce (citing Herma Hill Kay, An 
Appraisal of California’s No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 291, 297 (1987)); Mahoney, supra note 
234, at 1288; Linda C. McClain, The “Male Problematic” and the Problems of Family Law: A Response to 
Don Browning’s “Critical Familism,” 56 EMORY L.J. 1407, 1422 (2007) (identifying violence as a 
significant factor leading to divorce); Lynn Hecht Schafran, Gender Bias in the Courts, in WOMEN AS 
SINGLE PARENTS: CONFRONTING INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS IN THE COURTS, THE 
WORKPLACE, AND THE HOUSING MARKET 39, 59 (Elizabeth A. Mulroy ed., 1988) (arguing that 
domestic violence is often what leads a woman into divorce); Singer, supra note 168, at 1547. 
 280 DONALD G. DUTTON, THE DOMESTIC ASSAULT OF WOMEN: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE PERSPECTIVES 64 (1995).   
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for violating traditional gender roles,281 or whenever they felt distress over 
status erosion within the family—evoked, for example, by wives’ higher 
earnings or by becoming unemployed.282  
In sum, many women’s, and even men’s, explanations of divorce expose 
modern marriages as rife with gender injustices that undermine women's 
dignity and equality in and outside the home.  For divorcing women, staying 
married represented ongoing subservience, while getting divorced 
constituted their resistance to subordination, domestic violence, and the 
“stalled sex-role revolution at home.”283  To this we now turn. 
2.  “His” and “Her” Divorce: From Private Patriarchy to Gender Emancipation  
Since wives and husbands experience marriage so differently, it should 
come as no surprise that just as there is a “his” and “her” marriage, there is 
also “his” and “her” divorce.  And “her” divorce is much better than “his.”284 
The divorce literature consistently finds that women, far from losing their 
identity without marriage, fare significantly better than when they were 
 
 281 VICTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN’S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 74 (1988); Joanna Bunker 
Rohrbaugh, Domestic Violence in Same-Gender Relationships, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 287, 292 (2006) (arguing 
that wife battering “is related to rigid gender roles because men who beat their wives or girlfriends 
often ‘engage in a coherent and disciplined rage to defend what they consider to be their rights,’ 
which the men construe to be absolute authority over ‘their’ women”).  See generally Matthew 
Jakupcak et al., The Role of Masculine Ideology and Masculine Gender Role Stress in Men’s Perpetuation of 
Relationship Violence, 3 PSYCHOL. MEN & MASCULINITY 97 (2002). 
 282 For example, one study on the attitudes of low-income African-American young men found that 
they aspire to a marital ideal where they provide for and protect their family in exchange for being 
“the undisputed head of the household” who is in charge of making “the major decisions concerning 
the family,” and that inability to be a “patriarch in the home” leads to troubling consequences: 
“[w]hen men marry and are unable to establish domestic control, physical abuse sometimes 
follows.”  ANDERSON, supra note 247, at 189; MCCLAIN, supra note 2, at 139.  Indeed, other studies 
reported that physical violence was twice as high in families with an unemployed husband and 
working wife than in families in which both spouses or only the husband was employed.  
HETHERINGTON & KELLY, supra note 177, at 36; Deborah M. Weissman, The Personal is Political—
and Economic: Rethinking Domestic Violence, 2007 BYU L. REV. 387, 419–30 (examining how loss of 
employment and subsequent failure to live up to prescribed gender roles relate to occurrence of 
domestic violence). 
 283 Edin, supra note 11, at 130; see also Joshua Cohen, The Arc of the Moral Universe, 26 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
91, 93–94 (1997) (suggesting that human moral and emotional makeup is such that a group’s 
chronic experience of relative powerlessness within a basic social institution must inevitably lead to 
a recognition of injustice and a rebellion against it).  
 284 RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 15.  This is also a foundational theme of HETHERINGTON & KELLY, 
supra note 177, at ch. 2 (titled “The His and Her Marriage; The His and Her Divorce”). 
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married.285  As one divorce scholar put it, whereas men tend to feel “whole 
in marriage and half a self without it,” women tend to feel more whole after 
divorce.286  Women’s divorce accounts speak volumes about how the right to 
marital freedom remedies subordination, enhances women’s capacities for 
personal self-government, and even contributes to co-sovereignty with 
husbands in subsequent remarriages. 
In her research on divorced women, Cutting Loose: Why Women Who End 
Their Marriages Do So Well, Ashton Applewhite reports that the women in her 
study were unanimous in their happiness about getting divorced;287 the more 
time passed the happier they became and the more conviction they felt that 
divorce was the right decision.288  In fact, almost all the women in the study 
regretted that they had stayed married as long as they did.289  These findings 
are remarkable given that many women in the study faced considerable 
financial hardship, yet even the neediest among them reported that their 
overall situation improved after divorce290 and that the pleasures of being 
self-sufficient overwhelmed material loss.291  Indeed, even Lenore Weitzman, 
who famously documented the feminization of poverty among divorced 
women, could not find women who regretted the decision to exit.292  
The word “freedom” surfaces repeatedly in women’s divorce accounts293  
to convey wives’ sense of escape from subordination to husbands and to 
 
 285 CLARKE-STEWART & BRENTANO, supra note 258, at 100; RIANE TENNENHAUS EISLER, 
DISSOLUTION: NO-FAULT DIVORCE, MARRIAGE, AND THE FUTURE OF WOMEN 136, 139 (1977). 
 286 RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 197; see also NAPIER, supra note 193, at 126, 272. 
 287 APPLEWHITE, supra note 16, at xv, 27 (women take charge of their lives after divorce and emerge 
“stronger, clearer, and infinitely happier”); RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at ix. 
 288 See APPLEWHITE, supra note 16, at 165–67; FALUDI, supra note 196, at 26 (stating that the “nation’s 
largest study on the long-term effects of divorce found that five years after divorce, two-thirds of the 
women were happier with their lives, and after ten years 80 percent of women thought divorce was 
the right decision.”).   
 289 APPLEWHITE, supra note 16, at 24. 
 290 Id. at 28, 98–99 (“One [woman] after another described living on less but having it feel like more”); 
see also id. at 125.  
 291 Id. at 29, 122 (divorced women’s “reduced circumstances translated into a better quality of life.”). 
 292 WEITZMAN, supra note 138, at 346 (“Even the longer-married older housewives who suffer the 
greatest financial hardships after divorce (and who feel most economically deprived, most angry, 
and most ‘cheated’ by the divorce settlement) say they are ‘personally’ better off than they were 
during marriage. . . .  They also report improved self-esteem, more pride in their appearance and 
greater competence in all aspects of their lives.”). 
 293 RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 165. 
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evoke their ongoing path to autonomy and self-realization.294  Working- and 
middle-class women alike describe divorce as “liberation,” “control,” and 
“independence,”295 and as an instrument allowing them “the freedom to be 
myself,” to be “more like a free person,” to “liv[e] again,” and to feel 
“energized and liberated.”296  The language of freedom is particularly 
pronounced among women who escape domestic violence, but even escape 
from subtler forms of male authority is celebrated.297  
Women’s frequent invocation of the terminology of freedom comple-
ments their perception of their marriages as “filled with constraint, 
subservience, and vulnerability to the authority of husbands.”298  By using 
this vocabulary, divorced women were: 
making a connection between what their marriages were like and what their 
lives are like now.  As they understand it, marriage brought subordination 
and divorce brings freedom.  They revel in a new sense of ownership of 
themselves.  Despite all the hardships—economic strain, role strain, and 
loneliness—women . . . experience more control than ever before over a 
variety of aspects of their lives and, concomitantly, a seeming zest and 
delight.299 
Indeed, women described marital exit as an opportunity to “take back” 
their lives and realize their full potential,300 as a “gateway to pathways 
associated with joy, satisfaction and attainments.”301  Most women indeed 
succeeded in carving out lives of “unparalleled productivity and richness, on 
their own terms.”302  In particular, divorced women tend to experience 
growth in three general areas: competence in the management of daily life, 
a fuller sense of identity, and development of social relationships.303  
 
 294 Id. at 165–67, 205 (women view divorce as freedom from husbands’ dominance); Elizabeth S. Scott, 
Divorce, Children’s Welfare, and the Culture Wars, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 95, 109 (2001). 
 295 RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 165. 
 296 Id. at 165, 167. 
 297 Id. at 166–67 (noting women’s deep appreciation of the pleasures of their new-found freedom). 
 298 Id. at 167; APPLEWHITE, supra note 16, at xv (women “came to realize that traditional marriage 
serves the husband, the wife serves the marriage – and that independence beat servitude.”). 
 299 RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 165. 
 300 APPLEWHITE, supra note 16, at 1–4 (divorce is an experience that proved liberating for women and 
brings opportunities for personal growth); RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 165 (discussing the 
liberating effect of divorce on bringing out control and independence). 
 301 HETHERINGTON & KELLY, supra note 177, at 280. 
 302 APPLEWHITE, supra note 16, at xvi.  
 303 RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 163; see also id. at 177–78 (divorce made women grow beyond the 
“childlike dependency” that marriage engenders and they “repeatedly use metaphors of maturation 
to describe themselves” in the post-divorce life); JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN B. KELLY, 
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With respect to competence in the management of daily life, divorced 
women experience more personal autonomy, self-sufficiency, and personal 
growth than married women.304  Divorced women report moving past their 
dependency on husbands and gaining feelings of efficacy, confidence, and 
self-respect.305  One recent study found that, a decade after divorce, three 
quarters of divorced women experience increases in personal power, develop 
independence, and even achieve financial security.306  In fact, divorced 
women tend to earn more than both their married and never-married 
counterparts.307  Even women who experience economic deprivation 
following divorce, however, generally feel better off with less money but more 
control over it.308  Ex-wives reported that divorce, or freedom from their 
husbands’ authority, expanded their vision of future possibilities and 
encouraged them to seize opportunities in the marketplace.309 
In terms of women’s sense of identity, divorce proved a pathway for 
women to fulfill themselves.  Many women experienced divorce as 
transformative and regenerative, as a way of asserting their possession of an 
individual self, capable of acting in and on the world.  For them, divorce 
“defines a sense of self and leads to greater maturity and self-knowledge . . . 
that is stimulating and energizing and growth-enhancing.”310  Indeed, 
 
SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: HOW CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE 193 (2008) 
(confirming that divorce resulted in positive life changes for the majority of women). 
 304 Brinig & Allen, supra note 257, at 129 n.7; Nadin F. Marks, Flying Solo at Midlife: Gender, Marital Status, 
and Psychological Well-Being, 58 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 917 (1996). 
 305 ABIGAIL TRAFFORD, CRAZY TIME: SURVIVING DIVORCE AND BUILDING A NEW LIFE 163 (1984)  
(“For females a sense of growth in self-esteem appears to result from the divorce. The effects of such 
changes appear long-lasting”); RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 168–69. 
 306 Mary E. Duffy, Carolyn Thomas & Claudia Trayner, Women’s Reflections on Divorce—10 Years Later, 
23 HEALTH CARE FOR WOMEN INT’L 550 (2002). 
 307 Bernstein, supra note 186, at 178 (“[D]ivorced women earn more than both married and never-
married women . . . .”). 
 308 RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 170; WHITEHEAD, supra note 140, at 53. 
 309 APPLEWHITE, supra note 16, at 129 (“Career women participating in the study tended to boost their 
output, win higher performance ratings, and feel more motivated and satisfied with their jobs” 
following divorce); CLARKE-STEWART & BRENTANO, supra note 258, at 71 (finding that more than 
80% of divorced mothers are employed compared with fewer than 40% before the divorce, and 
women who were employed full time before divorce work even more hours after it).  Many divorced 
women return to school, enter the labor force, or reinvest in their careers, moves that promote 
feelings of fulfillment, competence, self-esteem, and efficacy.  Id. at 76–77 (discussing the positive 
consequences of divorce); RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 171–72 (noting that women repeatedly 
make the point that paid work, unlike housework, led them to “a fuller identity as they develop[ed] 
competence, confidence, and status outside the home.”). 
 310 WHITEHEAD, supra note 140, at 61. 
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researchers of divorce reported that such women presented selves that 
display “considerable innovation, competence, and mastery.”311  They 
invoked striking metaphors of dehumanization: that of being “in a cocoon” 
during marriage and of “coming out of a shell” and feeling like a “full person” 
following divorce.312 
In terms of their social lives, women recall constraining marital 
experiences, “burying” their sociability in deference to their husbands and 
interacting primarily with friends that originated in their husbands’ interests 
and work.313  In their post-divorce lives, however, women tended to solidify 
ties with kin, construct social networks that provide emotional and material 
support, and generally diversify and intensify relationships with others.314   
Notably, research indicates that individuals who have been divorced 
generally go on to pursue more egalitarian intimate relationships.315  Upon 
remarriage, both spouses tend to view their marital roles differently.  
Remarried women tend to be psychologically and economically more 
independent and assertive, and are likely to enjoy greater gender equality 
and power within marriage.316  Remarried men tend to become less 
traditional in their gender roles, more willing to support their wives’ interests, 
and more likely to share family responsibilities.317  Remarried husbands not 
 
 311 RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 93, 176–77. 
 312 Id. at 173. 
 313 Id. at 172–74. 
 314 Id. at 172, 177, 207 (marriage imposes constraints on women’s social network that divorce eases). 
 315 CLARKE-STEWART & BRENTANO, supra note 258, at 221–22; see also id. at 214 (most people learn 
from their first marriage and divorce and do not keep on making the same mistakes).  They may be 
more willing to compromise and more determined to succeed in their second marriage.  NIJOLE V. 
BENOKRAITIS, MARRIAGES AND FAMILIES: CHANGES, CHOICES, AND CONSTRAINTS (3d ed. 
1993); RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 201(highlighting research which shows that divorce transforms 
remarriage in positive ways, since divorce-veterans carry into remarriage the skills and 
understandings they learned from divorce); Rebecca M. Smith & Mary Anne Goslen, Self-Other 
Orientation and Sex-Roles Orientation of Men and Women Who Remarry, 14 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 3 
(1991).  
 316 CLARKE-STEWART & BRENTANO, supra note 258, at 222; Karen D. Pyke, Women’s Employment as a 
Gift or Burden? Marital Power Across Marriage, Divorce, and Remarriage, 8 GENDER & SOC’Y 73 (1994); 
Debora P. Schneller & Joyce A. Arditti, After the Breakup: Interpreting Divorce and Rethinking Intimacy, 42 
J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 1 (2004) (finding that a primary change divorcees seek in post-divorce 
relationships is greater equality within relationships). 
 317 CLARKE-STEWART & BRENTANO, supra note 258, at 222; RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 215 
(divorcees view their second marriages as more egalitarian then their first unions); Smith & Goslen, 
supra note 315 (remarried couples tend to be more egalitarian and more oriented to a balance 
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only contribute more to housework than first husbands,318 but are also more 
likely to make concessions during conflicts than they were in their first 
marriage.319  Research also suggests that the distress men experience during 
and after their divorce raises their awareness of their own and their wife’s 
emotional needs,320 and this in turn gives wives more leverage in remarriages 
than in first marriages.321  Remarriages, characterized by a more equal 
division of labor and sharing of decision-making power, are thus significantly 
more empowering and dignifying for women than first marriages.322 
In sum, given the historical and contemporary role that marriage and 
divorce have played in the lives of women, legislation that thwarts marital 
exit imposes special sex-specific burdens on women and cultivates gender 
hierarchy within the family.  Moreover, divorce-restrictive regulations 
deprive women of an important mechanism to incentivize gender equality 
during marriage, as the implicit or explicit threat of exit allows women to 
renegotiate the balance of power in their marriage and put pressure on 
husbands to be responsive to their needs.323  Indeed, the fear that divorce 
 
between self-interest and the other’s interest, as women began to focus more on self-interest and 
the men began to focus on the other’s interest more). 
 318 Pyke, supra note 316, at 86; Karen Pyke & Scott Coltrane, Entitlement, Obligation, and Gratitude in Family 
Work, 17 J. FAM. ISSUES 60, 65 (1996) (spouses in second marriages report that they share decision-
making power and household work more equally); Smith & Goslen, supra note 315, at 14, 19, 29. 
 319 CLARKE-STEWART & BRENTANO, supra note 258, at 222. 
 320 Id. at 233 (husbands in second marriages tend to be more helpful in household labor and more 
sensitive to their wife’s emotional needs than they were in first marriages). 
 321 Charles Hobart, Conflict in Remarriages, 15 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 69, 84 (1991). 
 322 FRANK F. FURSTENBERG & GRAHAM B. SPANIER, RECYCLING THE FAMILY: REMARRIAGE 
AFTER DIVORCE (1987) (arguing that the balance of power between spouses shifts toward greater 
gender equality in subsequent marriages, where husbands are more involved in domestic roles and 
women have more say in important decisions); HETHERINGTON & KELLY, supra note 177, at 179; 
MCCLAIN, supra note 2, at 152; Laura Hurd Clarke, Remarriage in Later Life: Older Women’s Negotiation 
of Power, Resources and Domestic Labor, 17 J. WOMEN & AGING 21 (2005).  
 323 RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 216 (noting divorce may exert various kinds of subtle pressures on 
partners to change traditional rules given the availability of conjugal change); OKIN, supra note 4, 
at 137 (discussing how the infeasibility of exit can impede the effectiveness of voice); Joanna 
Alexandra Norland, When the Vow Breaks: Why the History of French Divorce Law Sounds a Warning About 
the Implications for Women of the Contemporary American Marriage Movement, 17 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 321, 
346 (2002) (“So long as women occupied a position of disadvantage within their marriages, divorce 
represented an opportunity for leverage and self-assertion.”); Leslie Green, Rights of Exit, 4 LEGAL 
THEORY 165, 171 (1998); Carrie Yodanis, Divorce Culture and Marital Gender Equality: A Cross-National 
Study, 19 GENDER & SOC’Y 644, 646 (2005) (arguing that the threat of divorce serves as a “tool that 
women use to secure change and greater equality in marital relationships.”). 
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would force marriage to change to a more egalitarian relationship was a key 
in restricting this remedy throughout history.324  
The next Part takes the constitutional argument even further.  It will show 
that the state takes not only a passive role in private patriarchy by limiting 
exit from unequal or indignifying relationships, but an active role as well, 
which makes a right to liberal divorce all the more pressing a constitutional 
imperative.    
III.  THE ROLE OF LAW IN SUPPORTING INEGALITARIAN MARRIAGE 
While certainly there are many extralegal forces that fuel the systematic 
gender imbalances within modern marriages,325 the law also contributes to 
these gender asymmetries and to the constraints wives continue to experience 
today.  This Article earlier noted the law’s historical role as a cornerstone of 
a larger social system supporting and legitimizing gender subordination.  
Through common law and statutes, the state—as  the third party to a legal 
marriage—formalized gendered marital norms and expectations.326  
Domestic relations laws, of course, have dramatically changed and no longer 
explicitly institutionalize male supremacy.  But the vestiges of patriarchal 
privilege continue to hover over modern relationships, in that individual 
expectations for marriage continue to be shaped by the gendered allocation 
of labor the law once mandated.327  Moreover, a wide array of state laws 
 
 324 Norma Basch, Relief in the Premises: Divorce as a Woman’s Remedy in New York and Indiana, 1815–1870, 8 
L. & HIST. REV. 1, 2 (1990); see also Norland, supra note 323, at 330. 
 325 See also Frantz & Dagan, supra note 10, at 92 (analyzing possible reasons for the persistence of 
patriarchal marriages in twenty-first century United States); STEIL, supra note 178, at 101–11.  See 
generally Wax, supra note 2 (employing bargaining theory to analyze the many legal and extralegal 
forces that are arrayed against the egalitarian ideal of marriage and that make it almost impossible 
for women to obtain social equality with men).  
 326 See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND 
AMERICAN LAW 269–70 (1990); David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REV. 
527, 556–57 & n.150 (2000) (noting that until two decades ago many state statutes assigned 
unilateral decision-making power over family matters to the husband); Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family 
History and Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1135, 1139–44 (1985). 
 327 See Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 219 (2007) (arguing that 
marriage “has been irreparably shaped” by a discriminatory legal history); OKIN, supra note 4, at 
140–41. 
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today still shape family life in ways that promote gender hierarchy and 
demonstrate a “strong preference” for the traditional family structure.328  
For example, American tax legislation, unlike the law in most developed 
countries, penalized couples who challenged traditional gender roles,329 at 
least until the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017.330  Dual-earner couples were 
taxed at significantly higher rates than individuals who earned the same 
amount, such that tax benefits in marriages were greatest when one person 
was the primary wage earner.331  By penalizing a second income, and not 
taxing the imputed income of stay-at-home spouses, the tax system pushed 
women to work less in the market and more at home, which in turn helped 
perpetuate social stereotypes about female work “preferences.”332  As Akhil 
Amar has pointed out, the tax code, rather than individual choices, 
accounted for much of “[t]he great differential in wages” between married 
men and married women, which easily “translate[d] into differential political 
power.”333   
Other legal rules that relegate women to inferior positions in the wage 
market encourage, and may even compel, women to undertake dispropor-
tionately larger domestic responsibilities than husbands; such decisions in 
turn reduce women’s earnings outside of marriage and reduce their 
negotiating power within marriage.334  As commentators have shown, the 
 
 328 See MCCLAIN, supra note 2, at 78, 110 (noting the many laws and policies that encourage gendered 
division of labor); Johnson, supra note 199, at 127. 
 329 See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Wedded to the Joint Return: Culture and the Persistence of the Marital Unit in the 
American Income Tax, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 631, 631–32 (2010) (noting the minority 
position of American tax law in favoring single-earner married couples over dual-earner ones). 
 330 Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).  This Article does not explore the change in tax 
landscape in the wake of this legislation. 
 331 See COTT, supra note 113, at 223–24; EISLER, supra note 285, at 140–41; Shultz, supra note 124, at 
276 (noting the system of joint marital tax returns aids traditional one-earner marriages and 
penalizes dual-career couples by imposing higher taxes than if each spouse were single); Wax, supra 
note 2, at 617. 
 332 See Wax, supra note 2, at 617 (citing Edward J. McCaffery, Equality of the Right Sort, 6 UCLA 
WOMEN’S L.J. 289, 306–17 (1996)); Johnson, supra note 199, at 127 (“[B]y presenting women with 
the option of being the overtaxed second earner, or getting social security benefits and avoiding 
taxation, the code encourages women not to work outside the home.”). 
 333 Akhil Reed Amar, Women and the Constitution, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 465, 474 n.32 (1995). 
 334 See Mary Joe Frug, Commentary, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft), 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1059–65 (1992) (discussing legal rules that encourage women to assume 
disproportionate caretaking responsibilities); see also RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 215 (cautioning 
that even with the best efforts of couples, it will be difficult to sustain gender equality in marriage 
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gender gap in the labor market that makes it rational for women to conform 
to traditional gender roles continues to exist “partly because of gaps or 
omissions in the discrimination rules, partly because of the ways in which the 
rules have been interpreted, and partly because of the limited resources 
allocated to discrimination law enforcement.”335  For example, Title VII has 
proven an inadequate tool for challenging institutionalized work practices 
that exclude women, such as time norms, no matter how arbitrary or 
nonessential they may be.336  The courts’ interpretation of Title VII, one 
commentator concluded, “reinforces institutionalized work practices that 
push workers, both men and women, to adopt traditional gender roles at 
home.”337  Moreover, courts have validated work allocation schemes that 
channel far more men than women into lucrative jobs and unemployment 
compensation schemes that deny benefits to women who leave work because 
of childbirth.338  These legal rules all devalue female work in the wage 
market, thereby providing financial incentives for women to defer to their 
partners in determining the work responsibilities.  
Compounding the gendered division of labor is the law’s exclusion of 
domestic labor, still performed primarily by women, from the benefits and 
protections accorded to other work.339  By deeming housework a labor of 
love rather than a job deserving the dignity of economic return, the state 
devalues women’s contributions to the family and undermines women’s 
marital power.340  More importantly, the doctrine of marital services, which 
 
without job parity); Johnson, supra note 199, at 134–35 (discussing the subservient, gendered role 
that women inhabit as caretakers). 
 335 Frug, supra note 334, at 1061. 
 336 Courts have interpreted Title VII not to require employers to provide part-time or flexible work 
schedules nor to require parental leave after a mother is no longer physically disabled.  See Albiston, 
supra note 178, at 1134, 1136–44, 1152–54 (examining in detail the doctrinal constraints Title VII 
creates for unpacking the relationship between work and gender, and showing how this relationship 
informs courts’ interpretation of Title VII). 
 337 Id. at 1155. 
 338 Frug, supra note 334, at 1061–62. 
 339 See, e.g., JACOB, supra note 116, at 105; MCCLAIN, supra note 2, at 100; Herma Hill Kay, “Making 
Marriage and Divorce safe for Women” Revisited, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 71, 76 (2004) (noting that the 
homemaking wife’s work in the home “is still not a paying job capable of both producing current 
income and generating the right to retirement with an old age pension”).  See generally Fineman, 
supra note 180, at 2206 (noting that housewives receive neither compensation nor pension benefits 
for their labor); Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor Into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1 (1996). 
 340 See OKIN, supra note 4, at 130, 141, 150–51, 181 (arguing that the fact that women are legally forced 
to perform housework for free adversely affects their power and influence within the family); 
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to this day still bars interspousal contracts for domestic labor, further fosters 
the economic dependence of wives by preventing them from bargaining with 
their husbands for compensation for housework and child care.341  By 
constructing marriage as a regime of “altruistic” exchange, the state has 
systematically expropriated from women the value of a wife’s work, leading 
to their economic disempowerment and decreased power in marriage.342  
Relatedly, by refusing to enforce premarital contracts during the life of a 
marriage, the state puts women in the position of constantly having to 
renegotiate the marital bargain even though, as we have already observed, 
their bargaining position tends to decline over the course of the marriage.343  
The result is that women are exposed to opportunistic appropriation from 
husbands and often acquiesce in disadvantageous marital arrangements.344  
Without enforceable premarital contracts that cut off men’s leverage for 
renegotiation, the law contributes to men’s bargaining advantage and to 
women’s inferior negotiating position.  Legal recognition of interspousal 
contracts, as Vicky Shultz predicts, could “go far to equalize a wife’s earning 
power with that of her husband,” thereby promoting greater gender equality 
in the relationship.345 
Legal doctrines governing marriage and its dissolution further devalue 
women’s status and contributions and give husbands even more leverage to 
enforce their will.  First, the laws of marital naming consistently thwart 
gender equality.  In the past, a woman was encumbered with a legal duty to 
take her husband’s surname upon marriage, signifying legal ownership by 
husbands and perpetuating male dominance.346  Today, a woman is only 
 
Margaret Sokolov, Note, Marriage Contracts for Support and Services: Constitutionality Begins at Home, 49 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1161, 1224–25 (1974).  
 341 COTT, supra note 113, at 209–10; OKIN, supra note 4, at 122; Shultz, supra note 124, at 271.  For an 
example, see Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (Ct. App. 1993).  As Justice Poche in dissent 
correctly called it, the court’s insistence that a husband has an entitlement to his wife’s ‘services’ for 
which compensation is impossible “smack[s] of the common law doctrine of coverture.”  Id. at 21 
(Poche, J., dissenting).   
 342 Siegel, supra note 162, at 2208–10; Wax, supra note 2, at 526. 
 343 Wax, supra note 2, at 626–35 (“[T]he logic of disparities in bargaining power dictates that small 
initial inequalities of responsibility for household work inexorably tend to snowball.”). 
 344 Id. at 628, 648–50. 
 345 Shultz, supra note 124, at 271. 
 346 Deborah J. Anthony, A Spouse By Any Other Name, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 187, 201 (2010).  
On the concept of surname as signifying ownership, see id. at 208, 210–11; Omi Morgenstern 
Leissner, The Problem That Has No Name, 4 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 321, 358 (1998). 
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socially expected to take her husband’s name,347 but a man is not allowed, in 
a majority of states, to change his name to his wife’s simply by virtue of 
marriage.348  In fact, only nine states explicitly allow a man to change his 
name through marriage with the same ease and procedures as a woman.349  
In structuring naming choices based on gender, the law continues to signal 
that family identity revolves around men and that female names and 
identities are secondary.350  At the same time, the law discourages men from 
changing their name—a sign of ownership—as it is “virtually unthinkable in 
law and policy for a man to want to be ‘owned’ in that way by his wife.”351  
Second, the state still privatizes care, making the family “the private 
repository of inevitable dependency”352 and assuming a gendered division of 
labor in which “women’s roles typically are defined as subservient to the 
whole.”353  The burdens of family care doom women, as primary caretakers, 
to a life of dependency that is “socially defined and assigned, and that 
assignment is gendered.”354  Meanwhile, family and welfare reforms enshrine 
the image of a male head of household; the absence of a male provider is 
 
 347 To this day the legal system still clings to continuing patriarchal tendencies, expecting, even if not 
mandating, women to adopt their husbands’ name.  For example, immigrant wives who retain their 
maiden name risk that the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service will question the validity of 
their marriage.  Anthony, supra note 346, at 195; see also Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: 
Framing Rules and the Future of Marital Names, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 780 (2007) (describing the state 
attorney general’s opinion that a woman who wants to retain her maiden name is “odd” and 
“confused”). 
 348 Anthony, supra note 346, at 190.  A husband usually has to undergo a cumbersome procedure and 
a court process to convince a judge to change his name.  At least one court told a man attempting 
to take his wife’s name that getting married was not a valid reason for the change.  See id. at 202–
03. 
 349 See Anthony, supra note 346, at 204; Hannah Haksgaard, Blending Surnames at Marriage, 30 STAN. L. 
& POL'Y REV. 307, 315 (2019).  The most recent state to do so is California, which amended its law 
in 2007, acknowledging that “the choice to adopt or not adopt a new name upon marriage . . . is a 
profoundly personal reflection of one’s individuality, equality, family, community, and beliefs.”  
Name Equality Act of 2007, Cal. Stat. ch. 567 (2007) (codified, as amended, at CAL. FAM. CODE § 
306.5 (2020)).  Only four states allow for surname blending: North Dakota, California, New York, 
and Kansas.  Haksgaard, supra, at 309. 
 350 Anthony, supra note 346, at 190, 213, 222 (arguing “the law reinforces unequal cultural norms and 
archaic gender roles, represents and implicitly supports inequality, and violates the constitutional 
principle of equal protection of the laws,” and that the marital names law “perpetuates traditional 
marital gender roles and archaic notions of women as property”). 
 351 Id. at 211; Leissner, supra note 346, at 358. 
 352 Fineman, supra note 180, at 2209. 
 353 Johnson, supra note 199, at 134. 
 354 Fineman, supra note 180, at 2200. 
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constructed as a social problem and its presence as a vehicle for social 
policy.355  As the Shriver Report points out, “[t]oo many of our government 
policies . . . are still rooted in the fundamental assumption that families 
typically rely on a single breadwinner . . . .”356  In Martha Fineman's terms, 
“[b]oth divorce and welfare reforms attempt to reconstitute the natural 
family, by bringing the father into the picture through an economic and 
disciplinary connection reminiscent of the traditional male role in the 
hierarchical private family.  Patriarchy is thus reasserted and modified to 
meet new social realities.”357 
Third, the legal rules that dictate a significant financial disparity in men’s 
and women’s exit options substantially weaken women’s bargaining position 
within marriage.  Feminist scholars have persuasively demonstrated that 
coverture has been updated rather than abolished in this context: marital 
property laws that formerly failed to acknowledge women’s share in marital 
tangible assets now cut women off from property rights in what is typically 
the largest component of family wealth—their husband’s future income 
stream—a component which women helped to produce through domestic 
labor.358  By entitling a husband to exit with his income stream intact and 
leaving women economically vulnerable, marital property laws considerably 
enhance a husband’s already superior leverage within marriage.359  Perhaps 
even more problematic for women’s marital bargaining power is the fact that 
the overwhelming majority of states adhere to the “he who earns it, owns it” 
rule during the life of the marriage.  These states confer ownership and 
management authority based on formal title to property,360 thus devaluing 
 
 355 Id. at 2206–07. 
 356 MARIA SHRIVER, THE SHRIVER REPORT: A WOMAN’S NATION CHANGES EVERYTHING 76 
(2009). 
 357 Fineman, supra note 180, at 2207; see also Johnson, supra note 199, at 127. 
 358 See, e.g., Williams, supra note 190, at 2251–53; Sunstein, supra note 252, at 2427; HERMA HILL KAY 
& MARTHA S. WEST, TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION 270–73 
(5th ed. 2002). 
 359 Williams, supra note 190, at 2281; OKIN, supra note 4, at 167–68; Wax, supra note 2, at 549–51; 
Frantz & Dagan, supra note 10, at 92 n.67 (“The asymmetric cost of divorce likely contributes to 
male dominance during marriage.”). 
 360 This regime is so extreme that, even when there is a joint bank account, legal ownership of money 
in the account is based largely on wage contributions.  See Kelly, supra note 197, at 142–44, 157. 
The nine community property states are the exception, though all but one still refuse to adopt a 
joint-management regime.  See HOMER H. CLARK, JR. & ANN L. ESTIN, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 
CASES AND PROBLEMS 614 (7th ed. 2005); Kelly, supra note 197, at 159. 
 
522 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 22:2 
   
 
unwaged family labor as insufficient to earn an automatic property right.361  
This property regime thus plays an “influential role in power distribution 
within ongoing marriage,”362 cultivating wives’ dependence on husbands by 
diminishing the economic resources available to them, and perpetuating 
gender hierarchy.363   
Fourth, sex-neutral child custody laws that have proliferated in the last 
decades have increased sex-based disparities in bargaining power within 
intact marriages.  As studies have shown, the prospect of having to battle 
over custody and losing children further undermines what little power wives 
have in marriage.364  
Lastly, to this day, the state continues to enable marital violence, a group-
disadvantaging practice that denies equal citizenship to innumerable 
women.365  While the law no longer officially condones wife-beating,366 it has 
yet to provide sufficiently effective means to rout out domestic violence.367  
The legal remedies that battered women have at their disposal, including 
resources for shelter-care368 and sentencing rules for domestic abusers,369 
remain grossly inadequate to enable women to escape abusive marriages.370  
Moreover, whatever protections state laws purport to provide, enforcement 
authorities and the court system fail to deliver, letting abusers proceed 
 
 361 Kelly, supra note 197, at 145, 164. 
 362 Id. at 157. 
 363 Id. at 116–17, 146, 151, 164; see also id. at 145. 
 364 Wax, supra note 2, at 640–42; see also Carbone, supra note 227, at 60. 
 365 See the discussion supra Part II.B.2.c; see also Lela Gray, Municipal Accountability in Domestic Violence: A 
Promising New Case, 4 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 362, 363 (2011). 
 366 As nineteenth century women’s rights activists grieved, “[i]n the covenant of marriage, she is 
compelled to promise obedience to her husband, he becoming to all intents and purposes, her 
master—the law giving him power to deprive her of her liberty, and to administer chastisement.” 
See THE BIRTH OF AMERICAN FEMINISM, supra note 150, at 86–87. 
 367 Kay, supra note 339, at 87; COTT, supra note 113, at 211; Vi T. Vu, Town of Castle Rock v. 
Gonzales: A Hindrance in Domestic Violence Policy Reform and Victory For the Institution of Male Dominance, 
9 SCHOLAR 87, 101, 111 (2006); Claire Wright, Confronting Domestic Violence Head On: The Role of 
Power in Domestic Relationships, 32 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 21, 22 (2009) (noting that “the legal system’s 
treatment of domestic violence remains grossly inadequate”). 
 368 Miccio, supra note 106, at 138.  
 369 Washington State’s recent increase in sentencing for chronic domestic violence offenders in 2010 is 
a notable exception.  See Patricia Sully, Taking It Seriously: Repairing Domestic Violence Sentencing in 
Washington State, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 963 (2011). 
 370 Finley, supra note 63, at 430–31; Balos, supra note 243, at 574–75. 
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uninterrupted with their abuse371 and reinforcing gender subordination and 
hierarchy.372  For example, police arrest avoidance, the “pervasive lack of 
enforcement”373 of civil protective orders (“CPO”), prosecutors’ tendency to 
undercharge or drop the cases altogether, the notorious phenomenon of 
discriminatory acquittals of battering husbands, and bias in the courts still 
persist unabated.374  Many courts have further undercut the protective 
capacity of CPOs, interpreting mandatory arrest statutes to allow for police 
discretion to not arrest the abuser.375  This judicial accommodation of police 
discretion has proven harmful to battered women and has “dramatically” 
weakened CPOs as a tool for remedying and reducing domestic violence.376  
Further, some judges still mistreat victims of domestic violence, trivializing 
the abuse or blaming women for courting it.377  Finally, the lack of local 
government and law enforcement accountability—notoriously endorsed by 
 
 371 For example, the police often place domestic violence calls at the bottom of their response 
hierarchy.  See Miccio, supra note 106, at 130–31.  For a recent case documenting how the plight of 
one battered woman sheds light on just how inefficient the legal system’s treatment of battered 
women is, see Okin v. Vill. of Cornwall-on-Hudson Police Dep’t, 577 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2009).  See 
also Gray, supra note 365, at 365 (reporting “an overall inadequate police response” to domestic 
violence). 
 372 Balos, supra note 243, at 574–75; Tetlow, supra note 243, at 90, 95; Bethany A. Corbin, Goodbye Earl: 
Domestic Abusers and Guns in the Wake of United States v. Castleman—Can the Supreme Court Save Domestic 
Violence Victims, 94 NEB. L. REV. 101, 104–96 (2015) (stating that despite the prevalence and 
brutality of abuse, abusers “are typically only charged with misdemeanors—if they are charged at 
all”).  
 373 Vu, supra note 367, at 88. 
 374 Miccio, supra note 106, at 138; Vu, supra note 367, at 113 (noting that many male police officers fail 
to respond to protective order calls due to gender bias).  See generally Tetlow, supra note 243, at 77; 
RHODE, supra note 164.  
 375 See, e.g., Donaldson v. City of Seattle, 831 P.2d. 1098, 1104 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that 
police do not need to seek out and arrest an abuser if he has fled the scene by the time the police 
arrived). 
 376 Jason Palmer, Domestic Violence, 11 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 97, 105 (2010); see also Jane K. Stoever, 
Access to Safety and Justice: Service of Process in Domestic Violence Cases, 94 WASH. L. REV. 333 (2019) 
(discussing current stringent procedural barriers that result in the dismissal of high percentages of 
cases of CPOs). 
 377 Id. at 158–60; Phyliss Craig-Taylor, Lifting the Veil: The Intersectionality of Ethics, Culture, and Gender Bias 
in Domestic Violence Cases, 32 RUTGERS L. REC. 31, 37–38 (2008) (noting that courts may blame 
women for the abuse). 
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the Supreme Court378—“operat[es] as state condonation of domestic 
violence.”379  
In response to state governments’ failure to provide adequate remedies 
for gender-based violence,380 and cognizant of the profound link between 
violence against women and women’s equality,381 Congress enacted the 
Violence Against Women Act.  The Supreme Court, however, invalidated 
the legislation,382 in a decision regarded by Catharine MacKinnon as a 
“substantive victory for the social institution of male dominance.”383  
Even more strikingly, twenty-six states have retained, in some form, the 
common-law notion of marital rape as a “definitional impossibility.”384  
Many states either provide spousal exemptions or immunity for various non-
consensual sexual offenses other than forcible rape, subject marital rape to 
less serious sanctions than non-marital rape, or impose diverse procedural 
hurdles for prosecution, among them the requirement that marital rape may 
be prosecuted only if a couple was legally separated or divorced at the time 
of the assault.385  The state’s refusal to interfere in marriages involving sexual 
 
 378 See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (failing to recognize municipal 
liability claims even where domestic violence statutes require police officers to arrest violators of 
restraining orders). 
 379 Miccio, supra note 106, at 134; see also id. at 133–34 (“[accountability] failures contribute to 
continuation of the violence.”).  See generally Gray, supra note 365, at 364. 
 380 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 620 (2000) (acknowledging “that many participants in 
state justice systems are perpetuating an array of erroneous stereotypes and assumptions . . . [that] 
often result in insufficient investigation and prosecution of gender motivated crime, inappropriate 
focus on the behavior and credibility of the victims of that crime, and unacceptably lenient 
punishments for those who are actually convicted of gender-motivated violence”). 
 381 Bartlett, supra note 158, at 497.  
 382 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598 (invalidating the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 as exceeding the 
power of Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause). 
 383 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United States v. Morrison, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 135, 136 (2000). 
 384 Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst., 169 F.3d 820, 843 (4th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that seven states 
do not treat marital rape as a prosecutable offense, and twenty-six allow prosecutions only under 
restricted circumstances); Michelle Anderson, Marital Immunity, Intimate Relationships, and Improper 
References: A New Law on Sexual Offenses by Intimates, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1465, 1468 (2003); see also 
Hannah Schwarzchild, Same-Sex Marriage and Constitutional Privacy: Moral Threat and Legal Anomaly, 4 
BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 94, 108 & n.89 (1988); Hasday, supra note 119, at 1375.   
 385 Even in states where marital rape exemptions were abolished, the factual parameters of the offense 
are narrower than in other types of rape, the punishment is still significantly more lenient, and 
virtually all commentators note the dearth of prosecutions and convictions on marital rape charges. 
For a review of the literature on these points, see Shultz, supra note 124, at 277–78; Anderson, supra 
 
February 2020] DIVORCE AS A SUBSTANTIVE GENDER-EQUALITY RIGHT 525 
   
 
violence—effectively treating the marriage license as a sexual license as 
well—facilitates the domestic abuse of wives by husbands and strengthens 
wifely subordination.386 
Having helped in crucial ways to produce or reinforce sexual imbalances 
in marital power and to embed, perhaps indelibly, sexist assumptions about 
the respective roles of men and women in and outside the home, the state 
cannot disclaim any role in the gender hierarchy that continues to 
characterize most marriages.387  Today’s statutory rules and doctrines, at 
both the state and federal levels, along with the deeply gendered common 
law of centuries past, help cement the institution of marriage as it is currently 
structured and lived as a major obstacle to women’s equality.  To this day, 
marriages continue to feature a gender-based division of labor, grossly 
asymmetrical relations of power, economic vulnerability, domestic violence, 
and sexual exploitation.  Certainly, women are not pressured to stay at home 
anymore, and most of them join their husbands in financially supporting the 
family.  Yet, when they return home from the market, they are still 
expected—and typically have little bargaining strength to resist—to fulfill all 
of the wife’s traditional domestic and caretaking tasks and to compromise 
their workforce participation whenever it conflicts with the needs of their 
family.  
The work that wives do at home to enable men’s occupational and 
financial successes remains uncounted, unrecognized, and undervalued, 
undermining women’s opportunities to achieve economic independence.  
That gendered division of labor is duplicated in the marketplace, where 
women are treated as marginal workers and men as the “ideal workers”388 
who are expected to enjoy the domestic services of their spouses.  The 
economic subordination of women in the workplace in turn increases their 
dependency on husbands, limits female bargaining power in marriage, and 
further aggravates private patriarchy in the home.  
 
note 384, at 1486–94, 1496–97; Morgan Lee Woolley, Marital Rape: A Unique Blend of Domestic Violence 
and Non-Marital Rape Issues, 18 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 269, 278, 281–84 (2007). 
 386 See Marc Spindelman, Surviving Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1615, 1650–51 (2004).  
 387 Meyer, supra note 326, at 557; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1185, 1204 n.124 (1992). 
 388 The term “ideal worker” was famously coined by Joan C. Williams in her book, UNBENDING 
GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (Oxford University 
Press, U.S.A. 2001). 
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By so doing, marital inequality produces a vicious cycle that reinforces 
the dominance of men over women, from home to work and back home 
again, and impedes women’s progress toward full citizenship stature.  That 
feedback mechanism may seriously disrupt women’s lives and careers, 
frustrate their acquisition and development of human capital and labor skills, 
and generally make it less likely that they will be able to be equals in 
legislatures, judiciaries, and other positions of power.  In this way, marriage 
not only differentiates women’s and men’s roles in society, but also 
contributes to the perpetuation of a caste-like system in which women as a 
group suffer from inferior social status, lesser political and economic power, 
and even physical vulnerability.389 
CONCLUSION  
This Article has argued that barriers on exit that lock women into 
marriages in which abuse may reign and sex roles are rigidly assigned are a 
form of state action that inflicts dignitary and status harms on women by 
limiting their prospects and channeling them into circumscribed lives.  
Divorce-restrictive regulations perpetuate women’s social and economic 
inferiority, ensure that they live under the sovereignty of their husbands, and 
make it more difficult for women to participate as citizens on equal terms 
with men.  Moreover, these regulations compel women to stay wives, while 
in no respect alleviating—and in some ways exacerbating—the conditions 
that make marriage a principal cause of female oppression.  A unilateral right 
to a readily available marital exit is therefore indispensable if we are to 
alleviate gender stratification, release women from subordination and 
entrenched gender role expectations, prepare them to pursue roles that bring 
external valuation and recognition, and bolster their self-esteem, identity, 
and self-governance.   
In the final analysis, then, probing what marriage has meant for women 
and their status in society exposes the gendered power in a facially neutral 
dissolution regime and provides solid constitutional anchors for the right to 
 
 389 Wax, supra note 2, at 635; Karst, supra note 136, at 458–59; OKIN, supra note 4, at 25 (“underlying 
all [the substantial] inequalities that continue to exist between the sexes in American society is the 
unequal distribution of unpaid labor of the family”); OKIN, supra note 4, at 31 (many social goods, 
including time for paid work or for leisure, physical security, and access to financial resources are 
typically unevenly distributed within families); see also Sunstein, supra note 252, at 2411. 
 
February 2020] DIVORCE AS A SUBSTANTIVE GENDER-EQUALITY RIGHT 527 
   
 
divorce under all substantive visions of gender equality.  This is true whether 
one uses the anti-subordination principle, the historical interpretations of 
equal protection, or the Supreme Court’s emerging doctrine of “due process 
equality.”  This Article’s companion390 will further establish marital freedom 
as a formal gender equality right by applying the antidiscrimination principle 
to the divorce context.  All in all, marital freedom is thus not simply a legal 
remedy for broken marriages, but a critical component for a social order 
committed to securing equal citizenship and human dignity for all women. 
  
 
 390 Karin Carmit Yefet, Divorce as a Formal Gender-Equality Right, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 
April 2020).   
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